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SELF-INTEREST OR SELF-DEFENSE: LAWYER
DISREGARD OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE FOR PROFIT AND PROTECTION
Henry D. Levine*
Ovem Lupo Committerel
I.

INTRODUCTION

An exception to the attorney-client privilege permits an attorney to reveal otherwise protected confidences when necessary
to protect his own interest. It is traditionally invoked by lawyers
suing (or being sued by) former clients. 2 For decades it lay virtually ignored by commentators and the public, but of late the
venality of the American Bar Association and the cooperation of
the Second Circuit have combined to bring it to the fore.
There are no fewer than three distinct formulations of the
exception, varying in breadth and ambiguity. The earliest, developed at common law in the United States around 1850, permitted
a lawyer to escape the bonds of the attorney-client privilege where
"the attorney or counsel has an interest in the facts communicated to him, and when their disclosure becomes necessary to
protect his own personal rights"3 or, in other words, where nondisclosure "would operate injuriously upon the attorney's interests." 4 Narrow application followed broad statement, as disclosure at common law was generally permitted only by attorneys
seeking compensation for services rendered, charged with mal* A.B., Yale University, 1972; M.P.P., J.D., Harvard University, 1976. The author
wishes to express his thanks to Professors Charles Nesson, Andrew Kaufman and Monroe
Freedman, Judge Jack Weinstein, and Barry Garfinkel for their patient and valuable
counsel, and his gratitude to Harold Wolgel for asking the questions that led to this article.
1. To set a fox to keep the geese.
2. The most widely quoted statement of the privilege is Wigmore's:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, the communications relating to the purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 8 J.
WIGMORE]. Wigmore's discussion of the exception is scattered and incomplete; references
to the exception are found at id. § 2312 (2), at 607 & § 2327 (6), at 638. The most recent
cursory treatment of the exception may be found in C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 91, at 191 (2d ed. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as C. McCoRMICK].
3. Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 254, 262 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851). The
language reappeared often; see, e.g., 1 E. THORNTON, ATroRNEYs AT LAW § 127, at 200
(1914); E. WEEKS, ATrORNEYs AT LAW § 152, at 332 (2d ed. 1892).
4. Annot., 7 L.R.A. 426 (N.S. 1907).
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practice, or accused of wrongdoing in the course of litigation between other persons.'
These court-imposed limits were codified in the exception's
second formulation, Rule 213(2)(b) of the Model Code of Evidence, which renounced application of the privilege as to any
relevant communication between a lawyer and his client "upon
an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client."' This
version suited attorneys accused of malpractice but was useless
to counsel seeking compensation. The language was therefore
amended in the Uniform Rules of Evidence to provide an exception to the privilege for communications "relevant to an issue of
breach of duty by the lawyer to his client, or by the client to his
lawyer."7 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 (d)(3)8 adopted
that clause verbatim.
The third variation of the exception did not appear until
1969, and then it was as part of the American Bar Association's
Code of Professional Responsibility rather than as an opinion or
proposed statute.' Under the Code a lawyer may reveal "[c]onfidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to
defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct."10
On its face, the quoted rule is broader than the earlier
codification because revelation is permitted in response to accusations by third parties as well as clients asserting a lawyer's
breach of duty. The legal status of the Code is uncertain," but
the ABA's rule has already figured prominently in important and
controversial judicial decisions which have upheld its validity
5. See text accompanying notes 26-39 infra.
6. MODEL CODE OF EviD. Rule 213(2)(b) (1942).
7. UNIFORM RULE OF Evm. 26(2)(c) (1953 version) (current version at UNIFORM RULE
OF EVID. 502(d)(3) (1975)). This formulation is law in those jurisdictions which have
adopted the Uniform Rules. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 958 (West 1966); KAN. CODE OF CIVIL
PRoc. § 426(b)(3) (1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to 27-104 (1975); N.J. STAT. 2a: 84A20(2)(c) (West 1976).
8. Proposed Rule 503(d)(3) never became effective, for Congress refused to federalize
the rules of evidentiary privilege when, on January 2, 1975, effective July 1, 1975, it
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence into law. Consistent with the treatment of the
proposed rules of evidentiary privilege in Judge Jack Weinstein's work on evidence, the
words "Rule" and "Standard" are used interchangeably throughout this paper. See 1 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, Preface at vii-xii (1975) [hereinafter
cited as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENcE].
9. THE ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILrry (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODE] is the successor to the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL EHICS.
10. ABA CODE, DR 4-101(C)(4).

11. See text accompanying notes 109-124 infra.
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and confirmed its breadth.1 2

The temptation to consider the above, to note briefly that the
most recent formulation favors attorneys more than did its
predecessors, and to move on to a more interesting question
should be resisted. While at one time the wording of the exception
might have been merely an academic exercise, that is no longer
the case. Today the exception is a focal issue in the struggle
between those who maintain that an attorney has an obligation
to "preserve the confidences and secrets of a client"13 and the
SEC which demands that counsel disclose all arguable violations
of the securities laws by corporate clients or face criminal and
civil liability themselves." The reach given the exception will
heavily influence the arguments and tactics of both the Commission and the bar.
Even absent the current altercation, the exception deserves
scrutiny because it has been neglected by journals and commentators for more than sixty years 5 and it is surrounded by an air
12. See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975); Nakasian v. Incontrade, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1220
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). For further discussion see Note, ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: An Attorney's Right to Self Defense, 40 Mo. L. Rev. 327 (1975); Note, 29 U. MiAmi L.
Rev. 376 (1975). See text accompanying notes 100-105 infra.
13. ABA CODE, Canon 4, of which DR 4-101(C)(4) is a part, states simply that "A
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."
14. The literature in this area has multiplied exponentially within the past three
years. A fairly recent and extensive bibliography may be found in Mathews, Liabilitiesof
'Lawyers Under the FederalSecuritiesLaws, 30 Bus. LAw. 105 (Special Issue, March 1975).
The definitive statement of the organized bar on this matter may be found in the
"Statement of Policy" adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August, 1976, reprinted
in 31 Bus. LAW. 543, 547 (1975). The report accompanying the "Statement of Policy"
summed up its position on this issue concisely:
We do not believe that the policy of disclosure as embodied in the SEC laws
warrants an exception to the basic confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship. Such exceptions have to date been carefully reserved by the CPR for far
more critical and limited situations. The statutes administered by the SEC give
it no power to require disclosure by lawyers concerning their clients beyond what
is provided in the CPR.
31 Bus. LAw at 547.
The SEC's position in favor of lawyer disclosure of client fraud (as defined by the
SEC) dates from the Commission's complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,360 (complaint filed Feb.
3, 1972), which charged, inter alia, that the lawyers and defendants should have notified
the SEC concerning the misleading nature of certain financial statements. Other SEC
statements on the matter can be found in Mathews, supra. For a recent, unofficial,
response to the ABA "Statement of Policy," see Remarks of Paul Gonson at the Annual
Convention of the Federal Bar Ass'n (Sept. 11, 1975) (Mr. Gonson is an Associate General
Counsel of the SEC).
15. E. THORNTON, supra note 3 and E. WEEKS, supra note 3 were the last major
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of professional self-serving. It is difficult to feel comfortable when
the bar enthusiastically defends the attorney-client privilege, resists efforts to weaken or modify it, and then condones and even
expands an exception to the privilege which benefits lawyers and
lawyers alone.
Public regard for the legal profession is at a low ebb. The
Supreme Court, responding in part to this sentiment, has struck
down special dispensations which have long set lawyers abov;e the
law.'" We ought to reexamine such special privileges as remain,
including the right to reveal confidential attorney-client communications now accorded accused or unpaid attorneys.
This article analyzes the history and implications of each of
the formulations of the exception and finds none of them, particularly the ABA's recent effort, consistent with acceptable ethical
standards, sound public policy, or relevant principles of law. It
is suggested that the use of the exception in a given instance be
left to the discretion of the trial judge limited only by a few
guidelines. Such guidelines and the adoption of measures to discourage excessive use of the exception by attorneys are probably
all that justice requires.
11.

THE COMMON LAW EXCEPTION

A.

The Setting
The attorney-client privilege has roots in Roman law,' 7 but
the need for it in English courts did not arise until the testimony
of witnesses was legally compelled late in the sixteenth century.'"
To English barristers of that time, an exception to the privilege
for maligned attorneys would have seemed absurd, because the
privilege belonged to attorneys, not clients; it was "a consideration for the oath and honor of the attorney rather than the apprehension of his client,"' 9 and thus the attorney's to waive."0 Legal
rules with respect to the collection of attorney's fees were similarly primitive, for "the original estate of the legal fraternity in
commentators to give original thought to and discussion of the issue.
16. E.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (fee schedules by bar
associations suggested a vi6lation of the antitrust laws).
17. See Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CALi. L. REv. 487, 488 (1928).
18. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290, at 542-43.
19. Id.
20. "Since only the attorney's honor is involved, the court would not always attempt

to judge its standards or to enforce them if the attorney himself was willing to risk his
conscience and his reputation." Id. § 2290, at 545.
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England . . . was so elevated that they possessed no right to
demand compensation for their services. 2 1 Being a gentleman

had its drawbacks as well as its advantages.
As the basis of the privilege changed in the century after
1750, however, the interests of the bar also shifted. By 1850, the
articulated basis of the privilege was the interest of the judicial
system in full disclosure between attorney and client, unsupported by whatever remained of lawyers' honor. The change was
slow in evolving; only in 1833, for example, did Lord Brougham
establish that the privilege extends to confidential communications received without reference to existing or contemplated
litigation.2 2 Because of the slow pace of communications, important American courts were unaware of the decision nearly twenty
years later.2
Brougham's opinion also established that the privilege would
not extend to information concerning transactions to which an
attorney was party, because in such instances the lawyer's knowledge was acquired through channels other than his employment
as an attorney. 2 The courts in England, however, never created
a general exception to the privilege for unpaid or accused lawyers. 5
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

2 S. SPmsER, ATrONEY's FEES § 18.1, at 460 (1973).
Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833).
See, e.g., Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833).
See, e.g., A. CRoss, EVIDENCE §§ 248-55 (4th ed. 1974); S. PHPSON, PKWSON ON
EVIDENCE §§ 584-605 (11th ed. 1970); 1 P. TAYLOR, TAYLOR ON EVIDENCE §§ 911-938 (12th
ed. 1931). Nevertheless, 19th century English cases were often cited in support of the
exception in American treatises and annotations of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
The earliest, Chant v. Brown, 68 Eng. Rep. 32 (V.C. 1849), is not on point. It upheld an
attorney's claim that the attorney-client privilege did not end when the attorney (subsequent to the communication) became interested (as a devisee) in the property to the title
of which the communication related. The later case, In re Postlethwaite [1887] 35 Ch.
722, is also inapposite. There an attorney sought to invoke the privilege to protect himself
and avoid responding to questions, but was rebuffed on three grounds: a) the communications in question were between the attorney and client as trustees; b) the attorney and
client were charged with fraud; and c) they were acting as co-vendors of the property in
question, not as attorney and client. One of the few English cases actually involving the
potential use of the exception, Cleave v. Jones, 155 Eng. Rep. 1013 (Ex. 1852), held that
a client's account rendered to his attorney was privileged against the latter in an action
by the attorney for money advahced. Cleave thus appears to have rejected the exception
in toto. (Wigmore, incidentally, considered both Chant and Cleave "apparently unsound." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2312, at 608 n.3.) See note 136 for a discussion of
other exceptions developed in England.
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B.

The Cases
The exception was created by Rochester City Bank v.
Suydam, 6 an extraordinary case which at once invented the doctrine, gave it broad application, and anticipated fifty years of
further development. Alfred Ely had served as the general agent
and attorney for Suydam, Sage & Co. The company went bankrupt, but not before the Rochester City Bank lent it more than
$60,000 on notes endorsed by Ely. In its suit, the bank sought to
reach property on which Ely had a lien or mortgage. The bank
had learned of the property from papers shown to it by Ely to
induce the bank to extend credit to Suydam. Ely cooperated with
the bank, which wanted to affix to its complaint correspondence
between Ely and Suydam, Sage & Co, relating to the latter's
property and to Ely's authority with respect thereto. Defendant
Suydam moved to suppress the correspondence, claiming
attorney-client privilege.
Justice Selden's opinion first denied the motion to suppress
on the grounds that Ely was employed both as attorney and as
business agent and acquired the evidence in both capacities. According to Justice Selden, in order to be privileged, attorneyclient communication "should at least be made under cover of an
employment strictly professional"; these were not, and therefore,
were not privileged.Y
The judge might have stopped there but instead he denied
the motion on "still another ground": "[W]here the attorney or
counsel has an interest in the facts communicated to him, and
when their disclosure becomes necessary to protect his own personal rights, he must of necessity and in reason be exempted from
the obligation of secresy [sic].""
The modern exception is patterned after the approach taken
in Suydam although this debt was not always acknowledged by
citation in later cases. Since Ely was a defendant in the case, the
breadth of the exception as announced in Suydam was almost
26. 5 How. Pr. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
27. Id. at 261.
28. Id. at 262. Justice Selden continued:
It would be most harsh and unjust to place the attorney in a position in which

he must act in view of the virtual instructions from his client, and yet deprive
him of the only means of protecting himself. . . .His clients by giving him a
direct interest in the facts, from time to time, communicated to him, and by
dealing with him upon the footing of those facts have, as it strikes me, voluntarily waived their right to concealment as between themselves and the attorney.
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unique; no case until 197429 would again squarely hold that an
attorney may offer his client's confidences in evidence to defend
himself against a suit brought by a third party.
Other cases followed on the heels of Suydam and refined its
0 one Mr.
formulation of the doctrine. In 1859, in Nave v. Baird,"
Nave refused to pay his attorney, Baird, whom he had retained
to represent him in a suit later lost. Baird sued for his fee and
Nave counterclaimed, alleging negligence and Baird's refusal to
follow instructions. When Baird called Willson (an attorney who
had worked with him on the original lawsuit) to rebut Nave's
testimony concerning the content of consultations between Nave
and Baird, Nave objected and sought refuge behind the attorneyclient privilege. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the privilege did not apply where a client sues his attorney for disobeying
instructions or "unskillfully managing a cause."31 In light of subsequent decisions, Nave v. Baird is unexceptional in all respects
save one: The lawyer permitted to testify was not the attorney
3
accused of misconduct.
The third case to invoke and analyze the exception was
33
Mitchell v. Bromberger.
Like Nave it was an action to recover
attorney's fees, but here there was no counterclaim against the
attorney, and the attorney's testimony as to the nature and extent of advice given the defendant was thus wholly "offensive."
Yet the testimony was admitted. The court stated: "It would be
a manifest injustice to allow the client to take advantage of [the
attorney-client privilege] to the prejudice of his attorney; or that
it should be carried to the extent of depriving the attorney of the
' a4
means of obtaining or defending his own rights.
Besides authorizing an attorney's testimony in a wholly offensive setting, Mitchell also departed from the previous cases by
explicitly limiting the attorney's right of revelation. The defendant in Mitchell had argued that much of the attorney's testimony was unnecessary and had unfairly prejudiced the jury
29. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975).
30. 12 Ind. 318 (1859).
31. Id. at 320.
32. The theory behind the ruling must have been that the client's attacks constituted
an implicit waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to all communications
relevant to the instructions given by the client in the earlier litigation.
33. 2 Nev. 345, 90 Am. Dec. 550 (1866). The case cites to and quotes extensively from
Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
34. Mitchell v. Bromberger, 2 Nev. 345, 349, 90 Am. Dec. 550, 552 (1866).
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against the defendant. The court found no prejudice, but
counselled attorneys in similar circumstances not to "disclose
more than is necessary for [their] own protection."35
Numerous cases followed the three discussed above. By the
close of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court had recognized the exception," and it was accepted as black letter law by
the leading commentators 3' without material alteration from its
statement in the earliest cases. The one significant change in the
exception before the turn of the century emerged from a case
holding that defensive disclosure is permissible even in a suit to
which the attorney is not a named party, if during the course of
the suit one who is a party (presumably a client or former client)
accuses the attorney of misconduct." This extension was quickly
applied to the case of the criminal defendant who assails the
competence or integrity of his attorney while seeking a new trial
or other postconviction relief.9 Since 1866 there have been no
other material alterations in the common law exception or the
conditions attending its use.
C.

The Rationale
Beginning in the late 1800's scores of American cases have
held that, in the proper circumstances, a lawyer may reveal privileged communications with his clients when necessary to protect
his own interest. With some few exceptions40 "proper circumstances" have been found only:
1) When the attorney is suing to collect his fee;4"
35. Id. See Keck v. Bode, 23 Ohio C.C. 413 (1902), rev'd mem., 69 Ohio St. 549, 70
N.E. 1115 (1903).
36. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
37. See E. WEEKS, supra note 3, § 152, at 332. See also 2 F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF AGENcY § 2313 (2d ed. 1914); 1 E. THORNTON, supra note 3, § 127, at 221;
Annot., 26 Ann. Cas. 9 (1913A); Annot., 7 L.R.A. 426 (N.S. 1907); Annot., 66 Am.St. Rep.
241 (1897). Interestingly, the editors of later editions of Greenleaf's treatise on evidence
make no mention of the exception. See 1 S.GREENLEAF, LAw OF EvIDEN E § § 242-246 (15th
ed. 1892).
38. Olmstead v. Webb, 5 App. D.C. 38 (1894): "The object of the rule ceases, and
the attorney is no longer bound by his obligation, when the client or his representatives
charge him, either directly or indirectly, with fraud or other improper or unprofessional
conduct." Id. at 51. See also Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
39. Perhaps the earliest instance of this is State v. Madigan, 66 Minn. 10, 68 N.W.
179 (1896). Such cases now account for by far the largest portion of all instances in which
the exception is invoked. See cases cited at note 44 infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 100-108 infra.
41. E.g., Scott v. Bartholomew, 36 Ariz. 451, 286 P. 825 (1930); Carlson, Collins,
Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal. App. 2d 212, 64 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1967); Pierce v.
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2) When the client is suing the attorney for malpractice; 2
3) When, in a lawsuit to which the attorney is not party, a
3
client or former client attacks his competence or integrity.

Most of the recent cases in the third category involve attacks on
the competence of counsel made by criminal defendants in the
course of motions for a new trial or petitions for postconviction
relief.4
Courts have permitted disclosure under the exception on
three distinct grounds. First, it has been held that the client's
Norton, 82 Conn. 441, 74 A. 686 (1909); Daughtry v. Cobb, 189 Ga. 113, 5 S.E.2d 352 (1939)
(interpleader by administrator of estate; attorney sought fees for work performed under a
power of attorney which the client alleged to have been procured by fraud); Sokol v.
Mortimer, 81 Ill. App. 2d 55, 225 N.E.2d 496 (1967); Nave v. Baird, 12 Ind. 318 (1859);
Snow v. Gould, 74 Me. 540, 43 Am. Rep. 604 (1883); Weinshenk v. Sullivan, 100 S.W.2d
66 (Mo. App. 1937); Mitchell v. Bromberger, 2 Nev. 345, 90 Am. Dec. 550 (1866); Keck v.
Bode, 23 Ohio C.C. 413 (1902) (revelation permitted in principle, but attorney-plaintiff's
victory in lower court reversed on the grounds that communications revealed were unnecessary and prejudicial); Smith v. Guerre, 159 S.W. 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Stern v.
Daniels, 47 Wash. 96, 91 P. 552 (1907).
42. Though this situation presents the strongest case for use of the exception, opinions discussing it are rare. Most of the cases in this area involve counterclaims by clients
who have been sued by their former lawyers for compensation. E.g., Carlson, Collins,
Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 257 Cal. App. 2d 212, 64 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1967); Nave v. Baird,
12 Ind. 318 (1859). In other cases, the client does not counterclaim for damages, but merely
offers the attorney's incompetence as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Stern v. Daniel,
47 Wash. 96, 91 P. 552 (1907).
43. E.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888); Dewberry v. Bank of Standing
Rock, 227 Ala. 484, 150 So. 463 (1933); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Fink, 141 Cal. App. 2d
332, 296 P.2d 843 (1956); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Foulds, 167 Colo. 123, 445 P.2d
716 (1968); Olmstead v. Webb, 5 App. D.C. 38 (1894); Reavely v. Harris, 239 fll. 526, 88
N.E. 238 (1909); Jackson v. Swift & Co., 151 So. 816 (La. App. 1934); In re Estate of
Arnson, 2 Mich. App. 478, 140 N.W.2d 546 (1966); Leverich v. Leverich, 340 Mich. 133,
64 N.W.2d 567 (1954); Everett v. Everett, 319 Mich. 475, 29 N.W.2d 919 (1947); Doll v.
Loesel, 288 Pa. 527, 136 A. 796 (1927); Chase v. Chase, 78 R.I. 278, 81 A.2d 686 (1951).
44. E.g., Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1125 (1975); United States ex rel. Richardson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969);
Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Mitchell v.
Follette, 358 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1966); Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586, rehearingdenied, 314 U.S. 708 (1941); Pruitt v. Peyton, 243 F.
Supp. 907 (E.D. Va. 1965); Derber v. Burke, 239 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Wis. 1965); United
States v. Wiggins, 184 F. Supp. 673 (D.D.C. 1960) and cases cited therein; United States
v. Monti, 100 F. Supp. 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Jacobs v. State, 253 Ark. 35, 484 S.W.2d 343
(1972); People v. Morris, 20 Cal. App. 3d 659, 97 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1971); Morse v. People,
501 P.2d 1328 (Colo. 1972); Wilson v. Wainwright, 248 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App.
1971); Peppers v. Balkcom, 218 Ga. 749, 130 S.E.2d 709 (1963); Hyde v. State, 70 Ga. App.
823, 29 S.E.2d 820 (1944); Kennedy v. State, 232 Ind. 695, 116 N.E. 2d 98 (1953); Moore
v. State, 231 Ind. 690, 111 N.E.2d 47 (1953); Northup v. State, 272 A.2d 747 (Me. 1971)
(discussing the theoretical basis of exception); State v. Madigan, 66 Minn. 10, 68 N.W.
179 (1896); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 206 Pa. Super. 317, 213 A.2d 223 (1965); Rodriguez v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 438, 94 S.W.2d 476 (1936) and cases cited therein.
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conduct or accusations constitute an implicit waiver of the privilege, hence operating to unseal his lawyer's lips." Though waiver
traditionally is described as intentional relinquishment of a
known right, a client does not have to know of the existence of
the attorney-client privilege to be deemed to have waived it by

bringing suit against his or her attorney.46 For obvious reasons

waiver is rarely found in cases brought by attorneys to collect
compensation for services 'rendered, except when the client alleges the defective quality of the services as part of his defense.47
Second, it has been suggested that the exception is justified
when "as between the participants in the conference [between
attorney and client] the intention was to disclose and not to
withold the matters communicated . . . ."" Wigmore championed this rationale,49 but it has been employed only sparingly in
the cases. It was adopted by analogy from the rule that attorneyclient communications made when two people jointly consult an
attorney are not privileged in a later action between them." The
45. See, e.g., Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967) ("The
rule that a client waives his privilege by attacking the attorney's performance of his duties
seems to have been adopted unanimously by those courts which have dealt with the
question."). See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2327 (6), at 638. The theory may also be
stated without the use of the term "waiver," as when it is said that "the conclusion of
the courts appears clearly to be that it is the putting in issue of the fact of adequacy [of
counsel] that permits the court to receive the attorney's testimony." Northrup v. State,
272 A.2d 747, 752 (Me. 1971). See also Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375, 377 (5th Cir.
1940) ("He waives the privilege of the communication by himself making it an issue to
be tried and testifying about it.").
46. "[V]oluntary disclosure, regardless of knowledge of the existence of the privilege,
deprives a subsequent claim of privilege based on confidentiality of any significance." C.
McCoRMCK, supra note 2, § 93, at 194 n.14. Such unknowing action is often labelled an
"implicit" waiver. 8 J: WIGMORE, supranote 2, § 2327, at 634. The courts have been quick
to find waiver of the attorney-client privilege which will permit invocation of the exception. Indeed, a number of cases have found a waiver even where the attack on the competence or integrity of counsel was highly attenuated and indirect. In such instances, a
finding of implied waiver has been based on what amounts to an implied attack or accusation. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Peyton, 243 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Va. 1965); United States v.
Wiggins, 184 F. Supp. 673, 678 (D.D.C. 1960).
47. See note 42 supra.
48. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 91, at 191. See Minard v. Stillman, 31 Ore. 164,
49 P. 976 (1897).
49. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2312(2), at 607. Wigmore's scholarship on this point
is shoddy: Three cases are cited in support of the point. Id. § 2312(2), at 608 n.4. The one
American case, Nave v. Baird, 12 Ind. 318 (1859), does not state or support the doctrine
for which it is cited. The two English cases (both referred to as "unsound" in footnote 3
on the same page) are also not on point. Both upheld the privilege.
50. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 91, at 189-90; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2312,
at 603. See, e.g., Lea, Inc. v. District Ct., 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27 (1967).
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two situations, however, are fundamentally inapposite."

Third, courts and commentators have picked up the language of Mitchell and proclaimed the "manifest injustice" of per-

mitting a client to use the privilege to his attorney's disadvan-

tage.5" The language used often invokes an earlier age when the
privilege rested upon the gentility of the lawyer's calling, and the
right to reply to scurrilous charges was invoked to prevent a "dark
stain" upon the public esteem of members of the bar.5 3 McCor-

mick gave this theory a utilitarian cast, arguing that "practical
necessity" requires that if effective legal services are to exist 'at

all the privilege must not "stand in the way of the lawyer's just
enforcement of his rights to be paid a fee and to protect his
reputation."5 4

The principal limitation on the exception is that announced
in Mitchell: The attorney may not disclose more than is

"necessary" to protect his rights or interest.5 There is no rule,

51. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 91, at 189-90 offers two justifications for the
exception for a jointly retained attorney: The policy of encouraging attorney-client candor
is inapposite in the joint consultation case, as neither party could know whether secrecy
would hurt or harm him in any later dispute between them, and the mere fact of joint
consulation shows that the parties had no intention of keeping the communications confidential vis-a-vis each other. Neither of these justifications is applicable in the case of
disputes between attorney and client.
52. Mitchell v. Bromberger, 2 Nev. 345, 349, 90 Am. Dec. 550, 552 (1866); Stem v.
Daniel, 47 Wash. 96, 91 P. 552 (1907); 5 B. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE § 2165 (3d
ed. 1926); 1 E. THORNTON, supra note 3, § 127, at 221. See ABA Opinions of the Comm.
on Professional Ethics, No. 19 (1930); CAL. Evm. CODE § 958, Comment (West 1966).
53. State v. Madigan, 66 Minn. 10, 68 N.W. 179 (1896). See United States v. Wiggins,
184 F. Supp. 673, 679 (D.D.C. 1960) ("[The lawyer has a right to defend himself. His
entire professional reputation may be at stake."); Hyde v. State, 70 Ga. App. 823, 29
S.E.2d 820 (1944); Reavely v. Harris, 239 111. 526, 88 N.E. 238 (1909); Smith v. Guerre,
159 S.W. 417, 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) ("[I]t would violate a principle of natural justice
and inherent equity to say that the right of the attorney's defense is merged in a privileged
communication when the client himself makes a public accusation."); Rodriguez v. State,
130 Tex. Crim. 438, 443, 95 S.W.2d 476, 479 (1936) ("Any other rule would subject the
lawyer to any kind of scurrilous and unjust attack.") (citation omitted). But see Northrup
v. State, 272 A.2d 747, 752 (Me. 1971) ("In our opinion the waiver is not found to permit
the attorney to defend his professional reputation-although this may frequently be one
of the results-but to aid the Court in arriving at the truth as to the disputed fact.").
54. C. McCORMIcK, supra note 2, § 91, at 191. McCormick continues with the statement: "The only question about such a principle is whether in all cases the privilege ought
not to be subject to the same qi4alification, that it should yield when the evidence sought
is necessary to the attainment of justice." Id. See text accompanying notes 179-180 infra.
McCormick's rationale may or may not be more persuasive than those outlined previously,
but in either case it has not been picked up by those on the bench.
55. See 5 B. JONES, supra note 52, § 2165; 2 F. MECHEM, supranote 37, § 2313; Annot.,
26 Ann. Cas. 9 (1913A); Annot., 66 Am. St. Rep. 241 (1897). At least as early as Jones,
the authorities began using "relevant" interchangeably with "necessary." The most recent
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however, requiring attorneys to clear their testimony with the
judge before offering it," and the courts have been suprisingly

lenient in admitting testimony or other evidence which is both
highly prejudicial and only marginally relevant. One appellate
court, reviewing a verdict in favor of an attorney seeking his fee,
upheld the admission of letters from the defendant to the plaintiff
revealing that the debtor defendant "was engaged in leasing
buildings for immoral purposes."-" In the eyes of the reviewing
court the letters were admissible "to show that respondent had
rendered services to the appellant in the way of advice and consultation in regard thereto. . . . The mere fact that these letters
reflected upon the business or character of appellant was not
sufficient reason for excluding them." ' When a lawyer's fee is at
stake, the quality of judicial mercy is not strained.
In discussions of the exception, a handful of cages are often
cited which do not fit into one of the pigeonholes discussed above.
Cummings v. Irwin"s and Koeber v. Somers,6" for example, are
frequently cited for the proposition that attorney disclosure of
confidential communications is permissible when revelation is
"for the protection of those with whom he has had business transactions in the interests of his client.""1 Both cases involved clients
treatise, for example, states that revelation is permissible "to the extent necessary" to
defend an attorney's rights, but a footnote accompanying the statement cites only two
cases, both of which speak of relevance rather than necessity. See 2 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE,
supra note 8, %503(d)(3)(01). There would seem to be a significant difference between
evidence which is merely relevant and that which is necessary or essential. See text
accompanying notes 79-82 infra.
56. In practice none may be needed, as the attorney's offer of evidence is invariably
challenged as a breach of the attorney-client privilege, necessitating a conference before
the bench at which titie the nature and purpose of the evidence to be introduced emerges.
In theory, however, such a rule might prove useful, particularly if the exception is expanded to cover some situations arising outside of the courtroom. See text accompanying
notes 171-173 infra.
57. Stern v. Daniel, 47 Wash. 96, 98, 91 P. 552, 553 (1907).
58. Id. See also Mitchell v. Bromberger, 2 Nev. 345, 90 Am. Dec. 550 (1866). But see
Keck v. Bode, 23 Ohio C.C. 413 (1902), approving the exception in principle but reversing
a verdict in favor of a plaintiff attorney (suing for compensation) because of the admission
of evidence tending to prove the wrongdoing of the defendant client in the matter for which
the attorney had originally been retained. The evidence had been offered ostensibly "only
as tending to show the nature of the business transacted by the attorney and the character
of the work performed," but the court was not convinced: "[T]he purpose for which the
papers were offered could have been subserved by other means less liable to prejudice the
plaintiffs in error." Id. at 416. The case lost some of its weight as precedent when it was
reversed without opinion at 69 Ohio St. 549, 70 N.E. 1115 (1903).
59. 59 S.W. 153 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).
60. 108 Wis. 497, 84 N.W. 991 (1901).
61. 1 E. THORNTON, supra note 3, § 127; Annot., 26 Ann. Cas. 9 (1913A). Neither case
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whose attorneys were authorized to act as agents, but who later
sought to prevent the attorneys from testifying (as to their authority qua agents) in suits brought by third parties with whom
the attorneys had dealings on the clients' behalf.
In both cases the appellate courts upheld admission of the
testimony over objection that the relevant communications were
privileged. The holding in Cummings rested primarily on the
ground that the alleged attorney-client relationship did not in
fact exist. 2 Koeber's holding rested on three distinct grounds,
only the third of which is relevant here. "By a great number of
authorities," said the court in Koeber, "it has been held that no
privilege of secrecy exists over communications which the attorney, for his own protection or the protection of those with whom
he deals, needs to divulge .
"..."63
The only authorities cited are
the Suydam, Nave, and Mitchell cases, none of which says anything about protecting those with whom an attorney deals.
If Cummings and Koeber are sound, and they are, it is because communications made to an attorney with the knowledge
and intent that they be relayed to third parties are not confidential, hence not privileged in the first place. 4 Similarly, because
the privilege does not extend to cases concerning transactions to
requires the rule, and it ought to be disfavored as superfluous and subject to abuse.
62. Cummings v. Irwin, 59 S.W. 153 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900). Other factors leading to
the court's decision included the court's desire not to obstruct the easy passage of negotiable paper, or to defeat the ends of justice by eliminating the only witness who could prove
the fact essential to its attainment.
63. Koeber v. Somers, 108 Wis. 497, 507, 84 N.W. 991, 994 (1901).
64. The opinion in Koeber cites numerous cases in support of this rule. For example,
in Burnside v. Terry, 51 Ga. 186 (1874), the court stated:
If a party holds out his attorney as one having authority from him to make a
special contract respecting pending litigation and the attorney acts upon it,
treats with his antagonist and thereby secures important rights to his client, he
cannot deny the right of the attorney or of the opposite party to prove by the
attorney the contract and the authority to make it. . . . We would not trench
upon the sacredness of confidential communications of client to attorney, but
that is not intended to be confidential or sacredly secret which the attorney is
to propose to the other party as a foundation for bargains and contracts. ...
Id. at 191. See Fleschler v. Strauss, 15 Cal. App. 2d 735, 60 P.2d 193 (1936); McClure v.
Fall, 42 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, § 90, at 186 n.65.
McCormick further states: "Wherever the matters communicated to the attorney are
intended by the client to be made public or revealed to third persons, obviously the
element of confidentiality is wanting." Id. § 91, at 188 n.77.
The same rule, unrelated to the exception which is the subject of this article, may
explain two other cases which hold that an attorney who retains another attorney on
behalf of a client may testify as to his authority to take this action in the second attorney's
suit against the client for his fee. See Henshall v. Coburn, 177 Cal. 50, 169 P. 1014 (1917);
McDermont v. Bateman, 118 Wash. 230, 203 P. 66 (1922).
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which an attorney was party,6 5 contracts governing attorney's fees
are not privileged." The privilege is also inapplicable when an
attorney and client are litigating a matter which arose outside of
the professional relationship."7 In all such cases no exception to
the privilege is necessary because the attorney's knowledge has
not been acquired in the course of legal representation through
confidential communication with his client.
Other than the kinds of cases just discussed, only Suydam
does not fit within the framework of the exception provided
above, for in Suydam the attorney's disclosures were permitted
though he was defending against a third party rather than his
client. The difference in that case, as the opinion makes clear,
was one of form rather than substance because the real parties in
opposition were the attorney and client. As endorser of his client's
notes, the attorney in Suydam was liable only to the extent that
the bank was unable to reach enough of the former client's property to cover the notes.6" The essence of the court's holding is that
inasmuch as the attorney would have the right to use his knowledge in a suit between himself and his former clients, the plaintiff
may do likewise as he is "in equity subrogated to [the attorney's]
rights."69 Suydam, despite its peculiar facts, is consistent with
the principre'that the exception is available only to an attorney
fighting the client or former client with whom the communication
in issue was made.
D. Some Conclusions
On its face, the common law exception could have been given
65. 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 37, § 242. See Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep.
618 (Ch. 1833). See also text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
66. See, e.g., Strickland v. Capital City Mill, 74 S.C. 16, 54 S.E. 220 (1906); Annot.,
7 L.R.A. 426 (N.S. 1906). In recent years the basis for this rule may have changed somewhat. At least one court has recently based the nonconfidentiality of fee information not
on the fact that the attorney is a party to the fee agreement, but on such diverse public
policy grounds as the inherent power of courts to regulate the bar, the need to protect
clients from excessive fees and assist attorneys in collecting fees, and the need to protect
against suspected conflicts of interest. See In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
67. See, e.g., Arbuthnot v. Brookfield Loan Bldg. Ass'n, 98 Mo. App. 382, 72 S.W.
132 (1903) (attorney sought to cancel usurious note and to pay out amount due as found
by court).
68. As Justice Selden said of the attorney-defendant: "This suit is virtually for his
benefit, as application of the property claimed to the payment of the drafts, discharges
him pro tanto from responsibility." Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 254, 262
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
69. Id. at 262.
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a very broad application, but it is clear that the courts sharply
limited its availability. The use of the exception has been authorized only in controversies between a lawyer and a present or former client; although it is not required that the attorney and client
both be named parties to a lawsuit, they must be in actual opposition to one another before the attorney can disclose the client's
confidences. This is an important limitation, the more so because
flouted by the ABA in its Code of Profesit has been so blatantly
70
Responsibility.
sional
Offensive use of the exception has also been limited in practice, if not in theory. Consider, for example, a situation in which
an attorney who owns one thousand shares of Corporation A is
also, by coincidence, representing the wife of a director of
Corporation A in divorce proceedings. For evidentiary purposes,
(to prove her husband's depraved moral state) the wife gives her
attorney memoranda which she found at home indicating that her
husband had represented Corporation A in bribing various foreign officials. The bribes have cost the Corporation millions of
dollars and thus have cost the attorney, as shareholder of
Corporation A, thousands of dollars. As a result, the attorney is
contemplating a derivative action on behalf of Corporation A.
Can he use the memoranda? While the action is undeniably
"offensive," could it not be argued persuasively that the action
is essentially a defensive one inasmuch as the attorney is seeking
only to preserve his investment-"to protect his personal
rights.""'
Whatever the argument's merits, it has not been accepted by
the courts. On the theory that disclosure would protect the attorney's rights or interests, the common law exception might have
been construed as both a complete shield and a complete sword,
permitting attorney revelation of client confidences whenever relevant in a lawsuit brought by or against an attorney. Instead, it
has been construed only as a partial shield and a partial sword,
available solely in controversies between an attorney and a present or former client. Furthermore, even when available, the
exception may be used to abrogate the privilege only as to the
lawyer's communications with the opponent-client of the moment. Admittedly, the evidence that the courts have intended the
exception to be this narrow is largely negative; judges have not
70. See ABA CODE, DR 4-101(C)(4).
71. Mitchell v. Bromberger, 2 Nev. 345, 349, 90 Am. Dec. 550, 552 (1866).
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seen fit to extend the exception beyond narrow bounds, so this
author presumes that they have intended to keep it within those
bounds. There is also language in some cases, however, indicating
that the exception applies only to litigation between attorney and
client,72 and there is a great deal of discussion in the treatises to
3
the same effect.

III. THE UNIFORM RULE AND THE FEDERAL STANDARD
Given the history and substance of the common law exception, the language of the Uniform Rule of Evidence 502(d)(3),11
and the Federal Standard of Evidence 503(d)(3),75 which deny
the privilege to "a communication relevant to an issue of breach
of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer,"7
is "in all accord with all the cases"7 and has neither the intention
nor the effect of narrowing the scope of the exception.
72. See, e.g., Stern v. Daniel, 47 Wash. 96, 91 P. 552 (1970):
It is also claimed that these letters were privileged, and that the court erroneously admitted them. They would have been privileged, no doubt as between
either of the parties to this suit and third parties; but as between the attorney
and client the rule of privilege will not be enforced where the client charges
mismanagement of his cause by the attorney ...
Id. at 98, 91 P. at 553.
73. The following speak of the exception only in the context of litigation or other
controversy between the attorney and client: 3 JoNEs ON EVIDENCE § 21:19 (6th ed. 1972);
C. MCCORMICK supra note 2, § 91, at 191, 2 F. MECHEM, supra note 37, § 2312; 1 E.
THORNTON, supra note 3, § 127; Annot., 7 L.R.A. 426 (N.S. 1907).
After an extensive search for authority in support of the proposition that "an attorney
may reveal confidential information in order to answer allegations of wrongful conduct,
even when such charges are forthcoming from accusers other than his client," one recent
author was able to come up with only a single reference: B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 754 (3d ed.
1924). See Goldberg, Policing Responsibilitiesof the Securities Bar: The Attorney-Client
Relationship and the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility- Considerationsfor Expertizing
Securities Attorneys, 19 N.Y.L.F. 221, 250 n.104 (1973). The early editions of the Jones
treatise indicated that an attorney could protect himself either when he was charged with
fraud by his client or when both were charged with fraud. In fact, the statement may be
traced to Annot., 66 Am. St. Rep. 241 (1897), but the only case among those cited in either
source which bears even slightly on the statement is In re Postlethwaite, [1887] 35 Ch.
722. As discussed in note 25 supra, that case compelled an attorney to testify over his
objections, on the grounds that the communications in question were not between the
attorney in his legal capacity and the client, and that the attorney and client had been
charged with fraud, thus rendering the communications unprivileged as consultations in
furtherance of crime or fraud. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 95 at 199. Judge North
quite properly did not mention the exception for an accused attorney, as it was not
applicable-and does not exist in England. The frequent miscitation of the case may be
traced to a misleading headnote accompanying it in the original reporter.

74.

UNIFORM RULE OF EVID.

502(d)(3) (1974).

75. Fed. Standard 503(d)(3), 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 8,
76. See notes 94-95 supra.

77.

MODEL CODE OF EVID.

503(d)(3)(01).

Rule 213(2)(6), comment (1942).
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Despite their apparent precision, though, the codifications
are ambiguous in at least three respects. First, they do not specify
that the alleged breach of duty must arise directly from the matter concerning which the attorney was engaged by his client. California may have been attempting to remedy this when it required
that the alleged breach be one "arising out of the lawyer-client
relationship. 78 As written, however, the California requirement
is superfluous; if an alleged breach of duty does not arise out of a
lawyer-client relationship, communications concerning it are not
privileged, and no exception is needed to sanction their disclosure. This ambiguity in the codifications might be cured by including a statement to the effect that the only communications
disclosable under the exception are those between a lawyer and
client which relate to the particular matter out of which the instant controversy arose.
Second, the codifications fail to limit explicitly the exception's use to communications between the attorney and the client
actually involved in the alleged breach of duty. Privileged communications with other clients may only rarely be relevant, but
situations in which they are relevant are by no means inconceivable. Suppose, for example, that client A sues his attorney for
return of his fee, alleging that the attorney had represented A
inadequately because of a conflict of interest. A claims that the
conflict arose from the attorney's having represented both A and
B in a matter in which A and B had mutually exclusive interests.
A witness testifies on A's behalf that he was present at a meeting
during which the attorney was representing both A and B. In
order to prove the absence of a conflict of interest, the attorney
seeks to introduce into evidence communications between himself and B to establish that although he had at one time represented B, it was with regard to an issue unrelated to the issue for
which he had been retained by A. The common law exception
would not permit the attorney to offer the communication with
B into evidence without the consent of the clients to whom they
were addressed, but the Uniform and Federal Rules, on their face,
would admit such evidence.
Third, the codification may abrogate the rule that disclosures under the exception be limited to those necessary to the
78. CAL. EVID. CODE § 958 (West 1966). At least one prominent commentator has
suggested that this provision and the accompanying comment are "pertinent to the proper
scope of Standard 503(d)(3)," despite the meaninglessness of the provision noted in the

text. 2

WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,

supranote 8,

503(d)(3)(01).
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protection of the attorney's rights. Relevant evidence is any evidence having a tendency to prove a fact whose existence is of
consequence to the outcome of the suit and whose existence is
made more or less probable by the evidence." Clearly, there may
be evidence which is relevant but not necessary, and the need to
limit the scope of the exception warrants some effort to distinguish between the two and admit only the latter"0 as the common
law (albeit ineffectually) attempted to do. Recently, in Levin v.
Ripple Twist Mills,8' the court discussed the reason for the distinction. Although the Levin court was addressing the issue
within the context of ABA Disciplinary Rule DR 4-101(C) (4), its
reasoning is applicable to the exception as codified in the Uniform Rule and the Federal Standard. The court explained:
In almost any case when an attorney and a former client are
adversaries in the courtroom, there will be a credibility contest
between them. This does not entitle the attorney to rummage
through every file he has on that particular client (regardless of
its relatedness to the subject matter of the present case) and to
publicize any confidential communication he comes across
which may tend to impeach his former client. At the very least,
the word "necessary" in the disciplinary rule requires that the
probative value of the disclosed material be great enough to
outweigh the potential damage the disclosure will cause to the
client and the legal profession.2
A final question raised by the codifications is whether, although intended to track the holdings of the cases, they might be
used to expand the exception. It seems apparent that there may
be breaches of a client's duty to his attorney which go beyond
nonpayment of fees. Suppose, for example, that in a case like
Suydam83 the note holder won his lawsuit but found the note's
79. FED. R. EvID. 401; UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 401 (1974); UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 1(2)
(1953). Note that FED. R. EvID. 402 makes all irrelevant evidence inadmissible, thus
rendering superflous the language in Federal Standard 503(d)(3), limiting admissibility
to "relevant communications."
80. In an attorney's suit to recover his fee, for example, evidence as to the number of
hours worked, tasks performed (e.g., legal research, negotiations) and expenses incurred
is clearly both relevant and necessary, but evidence on the substance of the client's
problem (e.g., the details of a contract or settlement), though usually relevant to show
the nature of the services performed, will often be unnecessary and should normally be
excluded out of concern for the factors which underlie the privilege itself.
81. 416 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
82. Id. at 886 (footnotes omitted).
83. Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
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maker judgment-proof. He could then proceed against the endorser (the maker's attorney in Suydam) who would have a right of
indemnification from the maker once the judgment was satisfied.
If the endorsing attorney brings his action against the maker, may
he introduce correspondence with his client concerning the notes
to prove his claim?
Under the codifications the answer would clearly be yes, because the lawyer is alleging a breach of his client's duty to hold
him harmless as endorser of the notes and the correspondence is
relevant to prove the breach. At common law, the letters could
conceivably be found inadmissible because the exception is available to plaintiff attorneys only when suing to collect a fee. On the
other hand, they could possibly be admitted on either of two
grounds: (1) Ely endorsed the notes as a business agent rather
than as a lawyer, so that no privilege protects communications
surrounding them, or (2) the exception extends to all cases in
which disclosure is necessary to protect or secure an attorney's
rights, and this manifestly is such a case. Justice Selden would
have admitted the correspondence on the second ground." Justice
Selden's resolution of the question seems preferable to a decision
which, in a wooden application of black letter law, would reject
the evidence for failing to come within the exception's limits. In
practice, though, the broadening effect of the codifications must
be viewed as trivial for the simple reason that cases like Suydam
are exceedingly rare; when a lawyer sues his client within the
attorney-client relationship, it is almost always for his fee.
IV.
A.

DIsCIPLINARY

RULE 4-101(C)(4)

History and Contents

The Code of Professional Responsibility ("the Code") comprises the rules and guidelines through which the ABA seeks to
"point the way to the aspiring and provide standards by which
' ' In 1970 it replaced the Canons of
to judge the transgressor."85
Ethics and has since been subject to only minor amendments.
The Code consists of three separate but interrelated parts:
Canons ("statements of axiomatic norms"), Ethical Considerations ("aspirational in character"), and Disciplinary Rules
("mandatory. . .the minimum level of conduct below which no
lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action")."6
84. "Ely would have a right in a legal contest between himself and his clients, in
regard to his indemnity against the responsibilities assumed, to make use of the facts

within his knowledge." Id. at 262.
85. ABA CODE, Preamble.
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While the Code has often been considered an improvement over
the Canons, it has been criticized on a variety of grounds, one of
which is that it reflects the interests and desires of large, urban
law firms rather than those of the sole practitioner of the public
at large.87 The Code with occasional minor amendments, is in

force in every state except California8 and it has been incorporated by reference into the rules of many federal district courts."
References to client confidences and an attorney's obligation
to guard or, in some circumstances, to reveal them appeared in
several of the old Canons." Of greatest importance for our purposes is Canon 37, entitled "Confidences of a Client," which
noted the "duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences,"
and which provided details concerning the scope and implications
of that duty.' Until the mid-1930's the second paragraph of the
Canon provided: "If a lawyer is falsely accused by his client, he
is not precluded from disclosing the truth in respect to the false
accusation.

92

In 1937, however, an amendment to the Canon

deleted the words italicized in the quoted excerpt. 3
Canon 4 of the Code combines several old Canons under the
general heading "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and
Secrets of a Client."94 The new Canon includes six Ethical Con86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Note, Legal Ethics and Professionalism,79 YALE L.J. 1179 (1970) ("In
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as in the legal profession's previous code of practice, self-regulation seems inevitably to lead to the compromise or subordination of the
public interest to the short-range interest of the dominant segments of the profession."
Id. at 1197); A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 976 (Manuscript
1975). But see Sutton, The American Bar Association's Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REv. 255 (1970) (the author was the reporter for the
Committee which drafted the Code).
88. See Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests, 55 B.U.L. REv. 61, 65 n.23 (1975).
Adoption has been accomplished in diverse ways, e.g., promulgation by the State Supreme Court, enactment by the State Legislature, and this may affect the authority of

the Code in particular states. California has its own Code of Ethics, enacted by the state
legislature. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West Supp. 1975). The California Code makes
no reference to client confidences, but § 6068(e) lists among the duties of a lawyer, the
duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the
secrets, of his client." Presumably, this general principle yields to the exception, also
adopted by statute in California. CAL. EvID. CODE § 958 (West 1966).
89. E.g., E.D. Ark. & W.D. Ark. R. 1(g); E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. R. 5(f); E.D. Pa. R.
11.
90. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics Nos. 6, 22, 29, 37 & 41.
91. Id. CANON 37.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. The public record is strangely silent; there was apparently no debate over, or
explanation for, the amendment. See 62 ABA REP. 352, 765 (1937).
94. ABA CODE, Canon 4.
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siderations (EC's) but only one Disciplinary Rule (DR), DR 4101. That lone rule has four subsections, the third of which lists
exceptions to the rule of confidentiality:
[DR 4-101] (C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client
or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to
them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or
associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct. 5
It is not easy to divine the source of the language of DR 4101(C)(4). While the Rule is footnoted, the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, which wrote the
Code, cautioned against viewing the notes as an annotation of the
Committee's views. It would appear, however, that the Committee believed DR 4-101(C)(4) to be a restatement of the exception
as established at common law and in the Uniform Rules of Evidence." This it manifestly is not.
There is nothing in DR 4-101(C) (4), for example, limiting its
application to litigation in progress, though at common law the
exception was available only during the course of a trial. The
codifications make no mention of trial as opposed to nontrial use,
but as evidence codes they are only applicable in court." The
ABA Code, by contrast, is intended to govern all areas of legal
activity. The absence at common law of any requirement that
attorneys planning to invoke the exception seek permission to do
so in advance means little during litigation because the attorney's
offer of evidence will ordinarily be challenged as a violation of the
privilege and may then be discussed at sidebar 99 Outside the
courtroom, the absence of advance review by a judge of disclosures invites abuse by unscrupulous practitioners whose injured
clients will have no remedy other than a lawsuit filed after the
improper disclosure.
95. ABA CoDE, DR 4-101(C).

96. ABA CODE, Preamblen.1.
97. ABA CODE, Canon 4 n.19.
98. FED. R. EvID. 1101.
99. See note 56 supra.
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More significantly, the Code does not limit disclosure to
communications with a client-opponent in litigation against that
client-opponent; it seems to allow disclosure of client confidences
in response to third-party accusations. The common law exception also could have been read this way, but it was not. Yet the
Second Circuit, disregarding a century of rationally elaborated
precedent, recently held in the case of Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire
& Marine Insurance Co.10" that DR 4-101(C) (4) permits an attorney to reveal client confidences in answering a suit brought by a
third party.
In that case attorney Stuart Goldberg had assisted in preparing a prospectus for a public offering by Empire Fire & Marine
Insurance Company. He insisted on complete disclosure of the
fees received by his law firm in connection with the offering,
resigned when this was not forthcoming, and subsequently submitted a memorandum to the SEC concerning the matter. Empire and Goldberg were among several parties later sued in a
stockholder's derivative action alleging fraud in connection with
the prospectus, but Goldberg was dropped as a defendant when
he turned over to the plaintiffs' attorney a copy of his earlier
memo to the SEC. The remaining defendants then moved to bar
Goldberg and the plaintiffs' firm from participating in the litigation or disclosing confidential information to others. Finding that
Goldberg's actions violated both Canons 4 and 9 of the Code, the
district court granted the motion in part. 101
The Second Circuit reversed in part, exonerating Goldberg as
follows:
DR 4-101(C) recognizes that a lawyer may reveal confidences or secrets necessary to defend himself against "an accusation of wrongful conduct." This is exactly what Goldberg had
to face when, in their original complaint, plaintiffs named him
as a defendant who wilfully violated the securities laws.
The charge ... was a serious one. . . . The cost in money
of simply defending such an action might be very substantial.
The damage to his professional reputation which might be occasioned by the mere pendency of such a charge was an even
greater cause for concern.
Under these circumstances Goldberg had the right to make
100. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975).
101. 497 F.2d at 1192-94.
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an appropriate disclosure. . . . Concomitantly, he had the
'
right to support his version of the facts with suitable evidence.

Within little more than a year, In re Friend'03 followed and
expanded Meyerhofer. Friendheld that an attorney need not wait
to be indicted before disclosing client confidences as "it would be
senseless to require the stigma of an indictment to attach prior
to allowing Mr. Friend to invoke the exception of DR 4-101(C)(4)
in his own defense."' 0 4
The implications of the broad construction given the Code in
these two cases are enormous and troublesome and set DR 4101(C)(4) apart from previous formulations of the exception.
Like the common law exception, the Code's formulation of the
exception would not condone disclosure by the attorney suing
Corporation A's Board on the basis of the memoranda given to
him by the Board member's wife. Unlike the common law exception, however, the Code would apparently countenance the
revelations of a lawyer being threatened with indictment for filing
a fraudulent prospectus, even though he is not yet a defendant
5
in any lawsuit and has not been attacked by his client.' Even
more astonishing is that nothing in the Code would prevent the
attorney who is being sued by client A from disclosing his confidential communications with client B, despite the fact that client
102. Id. at 1194-95.
103. 411 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
104. Id. Friend was an attorney for (and officer of) Amrep Corp. and both the
corporation and Friend were being investigated by a United States grand jury. Friend
appeared before the grand jury several times and was invited by the prosecutor to produce
any documents which might exculpate him. Friend applied to the Southern District for
New York for permission to submit certain papers. Amrep objected, asserting the
attorney-client privilege with respect to the submission of some of the papers. The court
granted Friend's application citing DR 4-101(C) (4) and the Meyerhofer case. In a footnote
Judge Duffy acknowledged that "as yet, no formal accusation has been made against Mr.
Friend," id., but he decided to grant the application notwithstanding. Despite his efforts,
Mr. Friend, together with other Amrep officers, was later indicted for violation of the
securities laws. (The indictment against Mr. Friend was dismissed by Judge Metzner on
December 30, 1976 at the conclusion of the government's case.)
Construction of DR 4-101(C) (4) to permit disclosure in response to third-party accusations has been endorsed by at least one authority in the field of legal ethics. Judge,
Raymond Wise, author of LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1970), apparently agrees that "an attorney
is free to reveal cliental information in his own defense provided only that the accusation
arose out of or in connection with the professional services he rendered." Goldberg, supra
note 73, at 250 n.104.
105. These are precisely the facts out of which In re Friend, 411 F. Supp. 776
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), arose. See Heit v. Amrep Corp. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,406 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1975).
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B is not involved in the litigation in which his confidences are to
be revealed. The ABA at least seems to believe that it would be
more unjust to require its members to protect their uninvolved
clients than to force those clients to share their confidences with
the world.
B.

The Propriety of DR 4-101(C)(4)
As written and construed, the Code's version of the exception
can be criticized on two grounds. First, the provision contradicts
the letter and spirit of its foundation-the common law, codifications, Opinions of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, and even other portions of the Code. Second, the
rule is unsound as a matter of public policy because it is inequitable, undermines the attorney-client privilege and public confidence in the profession, and (paradoxically, given its intent)
will prove inimical to the security of individual lawyers.
The disagreement between DR 4-101(C)(4), as construed by
the Second Circuit,"0 6 and the common law is clear and needs
little elaboration. Though on its face the common law exception
was sufficiently broad to permit disclosure of client confidences
in answer to third-party accusations, it was so applied only once,
and even in that case de facto (if not de jure) opposition existed
between the attorney and his former client.' 7° The exception was
simply not available for use in disputes other than those between
attorney and client. 08
Conflict between the law of the attorney-client privilege and
the Code is complicated by the latter's uncertain legal status. On
the one hand, "[e]thics [c]ommittees do not pass on questions
of law."'0 9 On the other hand, the Code does govern lawyer's
conduct, supersedes statutes or regulations prescribing less stringent standards,"0 and provides a basis for disciplinary action at
which punishments up to and including disbarment may be im106. See text accompanying notes 100-105 supra.
107. See Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. Pr. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851). See
text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.

109. H.

DRINKER, LEGAL

ETHICS 32 (1953). See A.

KAUFMAN,

supra note 87, at 185:

"Committees on professional ethics consistently proclaim that they exist to give advice
on matters of professional responsibility and that they will not answer questions of law."
110. "[The application of the Canons is not affected by statutes or regulations
governing certain activities of lawyers which may prescribe less stringent standards." ABA
COMM.ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 203, at 488 (1940).
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posed."' Moreover, the Code at several points explicitly addresses
questions of law; DR 4-101 itself, for example, permits disclosure
of client confidences under certain conditions, after defining a
"confidence" as "information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law.""' Extraneous factors such as the
method by which a jurisdiction has adopted the Code may also
affect its legal status."'
The courts are divided on the question of the Code's legal
status. Some gave the Canons (and thus, presumably, give the
Code) the force of statute in cases to which they apply. 14 Others
have evinced admiration and respect for the Canons and/or the
Code but refuse to acknowledge either as binding.15 Still other
judges reject out of hand the imputation of legal authority to the
American Bar Association's various attempts at ethical guidance." Confusion is compounded in the federal courts which are
111. Disciplinary hearings must meet due process standards. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S.
544, rehearingdenied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968); Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949). Such
proceedings, if not conducted in the first instance before a judge, are judicially reviewable.
112. ABA CODE, DR 4-101(A). Among the other portions of the Code which address
questions of law are DR 7-102 and DR 6-101.
113. Thus, the Code might be given the effect of a statute where it has been adopted
through legislative action, but not where it has been adopted by Rule or Proclamation of
the State Supreme Court. See Letter from C. Russell Twist, Staff Director of the ABA
Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility to Henry D. Levine (Feb. 18,
1976) (a copy of which is on file at the office of the Hofstra Law Review): "Since the
method of adoption of the CPR varies from state to state, the weight it carries likewise
varies ....
114. See, e.g., Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 417 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968).
115. See, e.g., NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965) ("Observance of the
Canon is commendable. The Canon, however, does not purport to state the law governing
the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 906.). See also Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp.
258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[C]ourts have traditionally looked to the ABA Canons in interpreting the ethical obligations of attorneys . . . ." Id. at 261 n.4 (citations omitted)).
("The power of this court to disqualify lawyers is based on the court's general supervisory
powers, and questionable behavior will not be permitted merely because it is not directly
covered by the Canons." Id. at 263 (footnote omitted)).
116. See In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975):
While we recognize the power to compel testimony is not absolute, we seriously
doubt if any . . . bar association would seriously intend, or contend, that any
rules or recommendations or ethical advice they encourage their members to
follow, can by such mere approval, create a legal right or privilege in any attorney to disobey the laws of the United States, or the interpretations thereof by
the United States Supreme Court.
Id. at 892. See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975). But see
United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974). The court cited Canon 4 and DR
4-101 as the sole basis for a holding that the client's privilege against self-incrimination
permits him to prevent the government from discovering tax records held by his attorney:
[E]ven where there is no attorney-client privilege in certain material, as here,
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subject to the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.1 ' Questions of
privilege are matters of state law on which a federal court must
yield to the rule of the forum state,"18 but ethical matters and
disciplinary proceedings are not subject to the Erie rule."' Federal courts are thus free to fashion their own rules as to the latter
matters. 2 '
Inevitably, the line between law and ethics is a muddy and
wavering one, and the confusion has encouraged ethics committees who have taken a position on some issue to cling to that stand
tenaciously long after the courts have ruled the committee's view
incorrect as a matter of law. 2' Given such instances, we should
not be shocked to discover that portions of the Code repudiate a
century of common law with regard to the exception to the
attorney-client privilege for accused or unpaid attorneys.
Perhaps most difficult to explain are contradictions between
DR 4-101(C)(4) and other portions of the Code itself. For example, Ethical Consideration 4-4 states flatly that "[t]he attorneyclient privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client."' 2 As
we have seen, however, DR 4-101(C)(4) permits an attorney to
reveal confidences where the common law would not. 12rThe Ethithe taxpayer client may still have a legitimate expectation of privacy with
regard to that material because of the attorney-client relationship, and expectation of privacy which helps to give substance to a Fifth Amendment privilege
contention.
Id. at 453. The Kasmir holding, however, was expressly rejected in Michaelson, 511 F.2d
882, 893 (9th Cir. 1975).
117. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
118. FED. R. EviD. 501. See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
119. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, §§ 55-60 (3d ed. 1976).
120. Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964). See Handelman v. Weiss, 368
F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
121. Consider, for example, the attorney's duty to disclose perjured testimony by his
client if he discovers the falsehood before the end of the trial. The courts have consistently
found a legal duty on the part of the lawyer to reveal the perjury while ABA Ethics
Committees have advocated silence in the interest of the client and withdrawal from the
case (but not disclosure) if the attorney will not correct his testimony. See Note, The
Lawyer-Client Privilege:Its Application to Corporations:the Role of Ethics, and its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. Rav. 235, 251 n.88, 252 nn. 89-93 (1961). See also text
accompanying notes 135-143 infra.

122. ABA

CODE,

EC 4-4. See ABA COMM.

ON PROFESSIONAL

ETHics, Opinion No. 250

(1943), which states: "That portion of the canon dealing with employment which involves
or might involve disclosure or use of a confidence is not as broad as the rule under the
adjudicated cases. Likewise, the exceptions are not stated as broadly as in the adjudicated
cases."
123. See text accompanying notes 105-108 supra.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss4/2

26

Levine: Self-Interest or Self-Defense: Lawyer Disregard of the Attorney-C

Attorney-Client Privilege

cal Consideration implies that communications which are privileged are only a subset of those which an attorney is ethically
bound to keep confidential, but the Disciplinary Rule implies the
opposite. Similarly, EC 4-5 prohibits a lawyer from using information acquired in the course of representing a client to the
client's disadvantage, or for the lawyer's own purposes except
with the client's consent after full disclosure. These sections of
the Code, among others," do not foreclose an exception to the
obligation of confidentiality in extreme cases, as, for example,
when an attorney is sued for malpractice. Rather, they indicate,
at a minimum, that the exception is disfavored, and they are
violently at odds with DR 4-101(C)(4)'s radical step towards
condoning disclosure whenever convenient for the lawyer.
Finally, the exception as presented in the Code is inconsistent with prior Formal Opinions of the ABA's Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances (the "Ethics Committee").
Formal Opinion 202, for example, held in part that an attorney
might not "initiate, without consent of the [client], any proceeding to protect himself which would involve a disclosre of...
confidential communications. He would be justified in making
disclosure only if he should be subjected to false accusation by the
[client]."' 25 The footnotes to DR 4-101(C)(4) consist of references to, and excerpts from, Formal Opinion 250 which states
explicitly that: "We are of the opinion that the lawyer may disclose confidential communications in subsequent litigation between the attorney and client where it becomes necessary so to
do to protect the lawyer's rights."'2 6 Clearly, neither of these
124. E.g., ABA CODE, EC 1 which provides:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds
of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences
and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interest of other clients, nor the
desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
See United States v. Anonymous, 215 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Tenn. 1963): "Attorneys must
They owe their
not allow their private interests to conflict with those of their clients ....
entire devotion to the interests of their clients." Id. at 113 (citations omitted). See also
ABA CODE, EC's 6-5, 7-1, 7-9, 9-6, and DR 7-101(A)(3).
125. ABA CobiMu. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics OPINONS, No. 202 (1940). Opinions 19
and 250 are to the same effect, though less explicit. See Note, 40 Mo. L. Ray., supra note
12, at 329.
126. ABA CosM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics OPINIONS, No. 250 (1943). Opinion 250
suggested other restrictions on the use of the exception which are reproduced in the
footnote to DR 4-101(C)(4) but which cannot be found in the rule itself. For example,
Opinion 250 limited disclosure to cases where it was "necessary to protect the attorney's
interests arising out of the relation of attorney and client in which disclosure was made."
ABA CODE, Canon 4 n.19.
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Opinions contemplated the disclosure of confidences in defense
against third party accusations allowed by DR 4-101(C)(4) and
approved in Meyerhofer 17 and Friend.'5
There are also policy objections to DR 4-101(C)(4). First, it
grants attorneys an unconscionable power to reveal confidential
communications, with enormous potential for abuse in the hands
of unscrupulous counsel. Second, it frustrates the basic policy of
the privilege by discouraging candor within the attorney-client
relationship. Third, it gives the appearance of inequity and selfserving behavior and thus will further undermine already minimal public confidence in the legal system and the integrity of
lawyers. Fourth, it makes attorneys more vulnerable to attack
than they had been at common law, and will undoubtedly increase the frequency with which lawyers are named as defendants
in civil and criminal suits.
The first two criticisms follow directly from the liberality of
DR 4-101(C)(4). It has been over 150 years since the courts of
England and America established that the attorney-client privilege is the client's to claim or waive.' The privilege and the rule
barring attorneys from using information received from clients to
the clients' disadvantage or the attorney's personal gain' were
developed by the courts to encourage the candor required for the
proper functioning of the legal system. The exception to the privilege for an accused or unpaid attorney frustrates the policy underlying the privilege because it lessens the assurance that a client's
confidences will remain undisclosed until the client decides
otherwise. It thus may inhibit frankness between attorney and
client.'3 ' Extension of the exception can only further undermine
127. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975).
128. In re Friend, 411 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
129. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2290-91. See also Greenough v. Gaskell, 39
Eng. Rep. 618 (ch. 1833), and text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.

130. See ABA Comm.ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics OPINIONS, No. 250 (1943):
The provision . . . is in accord with the general rule announced in the adjudicated cases that a lawyer may not make use of knowledge or information acquired by him through his professional relations with his client, or in the conduct of his client's business, to his own advantage or profit. (Citations omitted.)
See alsoEmile Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973); Cannon v. United
States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 222 (N.D. I1. 1975); ABA CODE, Canons 4, 5, 7,
9.
131. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:The Remedy of Contempt, 1968 Wis.
L. REv. 1192, 1199: "An attorney who discloses without client consultation may lose the
trust of his client regardless of the significance of the information disclosed. The client
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the privilege, especially as the client cannot know in advance
which communications his or her attorney may later reveal, The

effects and injustice are multiplied if the exception is construed
to permit attorney revelation of client A's confidences to defend

against attacks from client B or a nonclient, for under such a
construction even clients who are on good terms with their lawyer

and in the habit of paying bills promptly may have their secrets
aired in open court. Furthermore, the exception's extension, and

its availability without prior clearance are conducive to abuse;
one can easily imagine a wealthy client paying inflated "fees" to
prevent disclosure of particularly delicate confidences.

'

Public suspicion that the exception is unfair and self-serving
cannot lightly be dismissed. A privilege similar to the lawyer-

client privilege protects communications with physicians and

clergymen; 33 yet physicians have enjoyed an exception to the

privilege only occasionally134 and clergymen have not enjoyed one

may thereafter become uncommunicative with resulting harm to the client's entire case."
The only other recognized exception to the privilege whose application the client cannot
readily foresee is that concerning legal services obtained to aid in the commission of a
crime or fraud. That exception is premised on the argument that a privilege granted to
improve the functioning of the legal system should not be used to defeat that system. See
UNIFORM RULE OF Evm. 502(d)(1) (1975) and Fed. Standard 503(d)(1); 2 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 8,
503(d)(1)(01). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 95, at
199. It is both more fundamental than the exception for accused or unpaid attorneys and
dependent upon a showing of fraud or crime in advance of the admission of possibly
privileged evidence to justify the exception's application. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1 (1933). Note that the ABA has sought to limit the use and reach of this exception. ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975), reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543
(1975).
132. There are isolated references to this problem in the literature. See, e.g., ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 19 (1930):
However, the line should be strictly drawn in determining the materiality
and relevancy of what the lawyer may properly disclose, since the fear of his
disclosure of confidential information, as to his client might easily be used to
stifle disbarment or criminal proceedings against him.
More recently, a noted authority on the law of evidence has warned that:
The exception should be more carefully examined when the lawyer sues the
client for a fee than when the client sues the lawyer. When the lawyer is the
plaintiff, sound policy requires the court to insure that the divulgence is not held
over the client's head as a tactical weapon to compel the former client to pay
up.
McLaughlin, The Treatment of Attorney-Client and Related Privileges in the Proposed
Rules of Evidence for The United States District Courts, 26 THE RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK 30, 36 (1971). It is probably concern over this potential
abuse which, at least in part, has motivated the restriction of the exception to "necessary"
or "essential" disclosures. See text accompanying notes 98-105 supra. See also Gardner,
A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VIL. L. REv. 279, 290 n.35 (1963).
133. See UNIFORM RULES OF EviD. 503, 505 (1975).

134. See, e.g., Fed. Standards 504, 506; 2

WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
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at all. More fundamentally, the rule that the privilege may be
used to frustrate the attainment of justice in all instances save
when the attorney is in danger is hardly a model of evenhandedness. 3 ' It is hard to justify the fact that an attorney may
not reveal confidential communications without client permission when such disclosure would be useful to a falsely accused
nonclient or to a tradesman seeking payment for his services, and
yet that very same attorney may freely disclose client communications when he himself is the accused (even if the accusations
are true) or when his own demands for compensation go unanswered.'3
The ABA has always been the leading proponent of a strong
attorney-client privilege in American law.' Since 1953, for example, the ABA has resolved the conflict between the obligation of
confidentiality and the duty to disclose criminal or fraudulent
also Van Allen v. Gordon, 83 N.Y. (Hun.) 379, 31 N.Y.S. 907 (Sup. Ct. 1894), (in which
a physician sued for his fee, and the patient's general denial held not a waiver of the
physician-patient privilege so as to allow the physician at the time of the trial to question
the patient on his illness or to testify as to the nature of the disease or his treatment of
it.) But see Pruitt v. Peyton, 243 F. Supp. 907, 909 (E.D. Va. 1965) (dicta); U.S. v.
Wiggins, 184 F. Supp. 673, 677 (D.D.C. 1960) (dicta);

CAL. EVID. CODE

§ 1001 (West 1966).

In England, of course, the lawyer-client privilege is unique, and there is no privilege at
all for physicians or clergymen. "The suspicion arises that the legal profession has carved
out for itself a privilege which it is reluctant to grant to other equally necessary and
honorable men merely because the privilege is good for the legal business." Noonan, The
Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966).
135. The attorney-client privilege has often been criticized as an obstacle in the path
to truth. E.g., Wigmore's famous phrase: "Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its
obstructionjs plain and concrete." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554. See Baird
v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). Recent codifications have dwelt at some length
on the proposition that all relevant evidence should be admissible, and to the extent that
this is a trend in the law, the attorney-client privilege has become at times an embarrassment. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 101, 402, Advisory Comm. Notes.
136. Comparison with English law on this point is instructive. The exception to the
attorney-client privilege for an accused or unpaid attorney does not exist in English law.
See note'25 supra and accompanying text. There is, however, a rule in England that "at
a criminal trial, no one should be able to refuse to produce documents which might
establish the innocence of the accused," even if those documents are subject to a claim of
attorney-blient privilege. A. CRoss, EvIDENCE §§ 248-255 (4th ed. 1974): "If there are
documents in the possession or control of a solicitor which, on production, help to further
the defense of an accused man, then in my judgement no privilege attaches." R. v. Barton
[19721 2 All E.R. 1192, 1194 (Crown Ct.).
137. Edmund Morgan severely criticized the attorney-client privilege in the foreword
to the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) where he stated simply: "On the other hand, a
proposal to abolish so ancient a privilege. . . arouses such strenuous opposition from the
Bar that it would be futile to attempt its enactment. Hence the essential features of the
Common Law privilege are preserved . . . ." Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 27-28 (1942). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 87, at 176.
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client conduct in favor of nondisclosure: "ihe confidential
privilege, in our opinion, must be upheld over any obligation of

the lawyer to betray the client's confidence in seeking rectification of any fraud that may have been perpetrated by his client
upon a person or tribunal." ' s

This position is defended by allusion to the legal system's
need for confidentiality, though it might also be said to rest on

concern for the needs of attorneys.139 It is of interest in part because it has been steadfastly maintained in the face of nearly

unanimous judicial opinion that it is wrong, " ' and in part because
of the unseemly haste with which it is abandoned by the ABA

whenever the apparent interests of the profession so dictate.
DR 4-101(C)(4) is one manifestation of the latter phenomenon, but it is far from the only example which could be given.

Consider the related problem of the lawyer who is ordered by a
court to reveal information he believes privileged, and so finds

himself torn between duty to his client and the threat of a contempt citation. This dilemma has troubled a number of commen-

tators and they have proposed various reforms designed to protect
138. ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIoNs, No. 1314 (1975). The
position was first adopted in Formal Opinion 287 (1953) over the powerful dissent of two
Committee members. It has since been reaffirmed on a number of occasions, most recently
in Formal Opinion 341 (1975). As originally written, DR 7-102(B) could have been construed as reversing this position, and as a result that Disciplinary Rule was amended in
1974 to remove all doubts. The ABA recommends that an attorney whose client refuses
to correct perjured testimony should withdraw from the case, but not reveal thb wrongdoing to the court or the opposing party. See generally Note, 56 Nw. U.L. Rnv., supra note
121, at 251 n.88; A. KAUFMAN, supra note 87, at 144-49, 182b-86. See also Note, 56 Nw.
U.L. REv., supra, at 252 nn. 89-93.
139. The amendment to DR 7-102(B) referred to in note 138 supra, has been described
as "necessary in order to relieve lawyers of exposure to such diametrically opposed professional duties." ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS' OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975). Of course,
a rule against disclosure creates more conflicts than it resolves by placing an attorney's
ethical duty at odds with his legal obligations. See note 140 infra.
It goes without saying that legal business would fall off drastically if ne'er-do-wells
(executive as well as working class) could not be assured that the lurid details of their
exploits would remain within four walls of counsel's office.
140. We cannot permit a member of the bar to exonerate himself from
failure to disclose known perjury by a self-serving statement that in his judgment he had a duty of non-disclosure so as to protect his client which is paramount to his duty to disclose the same to the court, of which he is an officer,
and to which he, in fact, owes a primary duty under circumstances such as are
evidenced in this case.
In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 260,322 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1958). See McKissick v. United States,
379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967); State v. Niklaus, 149 Neb. 859, 33 N.W.2d 145 (1948); A.
KAUFMAN, supra note 87, at 225.
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client rights without unduly burdening the judiciary.14 ' At one
time the ABA Ethics Committee unequivocally admonished lawyers to go to prison rather than reveal communications they
believed privileged,' but since the Code became effective in 1970
attorneys have been permitted to reveal confidences when
"required by . . .court order."''
Finally, it is illuminating to note that in this century, the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the New York
County Lawyer's Association, in a series of opinions by their respective Committees on Professional Ethics, decided that "[i]t
would certainly offend the sense of propriety" for an attorney in
search of payment to attach property belonging to his client when
the ownership of the property in question is strictly confidential
and was discovered by the attorney in the course of representing
the client. '" When the ABA Ethics Committee had occasion to
pass on the same question some years later its sense of propriety
was apparently less offended, for it held that a lawyer suing for
his fee could ethically attach property belonging to the client
though his knowledge thereof was acquired in the course of representing the client.'45
Other examples can be given of the Bar Association's tendency to subordinate the interests of the court and the client public
to those of attorneys. 4 ' In this respect at least, DR 4-101(C)(4)
141. The subject is exhaustively and perceptively analyzed in two student pieces:
Note, Attorney ClientPrivilege- Contempt: The Dilemma in Non-Disclosureof Possibly
PrivilegedInformation, 45 WASH. L. REv. 181 (1970); Note, 1968 Wis. L. REv., supra note
131. For a sympathetic judicial treatment, see Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490
(1968).
142. ABA CoMm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 312 (unpublished).
143. ABA CODE, DR 4-101(C)(2). "[Q]uery whether the resolution of the attorney's
dilemma has not [come] at the expense of the client now that express sanction has been
given to the sacrifice of the client's possible right to nondisclosure under the attorney.
client privilege." Note, 45 WASH. L. REv., supra note 141, at 190.
Attorneys should reassess their duties to their clients and the court. The affirmative duty of the attorney to guard his client's confidences requires more than a
futile effort to obtain a predisclosure appeal. Since the privilege is basic to the
lawyer-client relationship, attorneys should be vigilant in its defense.
Note, 1968 Wis. L. REv., supra note 131, at 1200.
144. AssocivroN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, OPINIONS, No. 158 (1930).
See ASSOCLTION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, OPINIONS, No. 508 (1939); NEW
YORK CouNTY LAWYER'S ASS'N, OPINIONS, No. 44 (1914).
145. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 250 (1943); Nakasian
v. Incontrade, 409 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
146. The ABA has vociferously opposed the SEC's efforts to compel attorneys to
disclose their clients' wrongful conduct (see note 14 supra) on the ground that such efforts
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is not a new departure at all, but simply an extension of past
practice. "7
The final policy argument against the Code's version of the
exception is a pragmatic one. The provision was presumably intended in part to increase the security of lawyers by enhancing
their ability to collect fees and discouraging client attacks. The

logical consequences of DR 4-101(C)(4)'s liberalism, however, is
more litigation against lawyers, not less. As ably stated in the

petition for certiorari in Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine
Insurance Co.,"' "an adverse party may effectively strip the
client of the protection of the attorney-client privilege and subject
him to unsupervised disclosure of prejudicial information by the
simple device of naming the client's lawyer as codefendant."'4 9
Because the lawyer as defendant is free to reveal the confidences
of his client, a plaintiff will sue both the lawyer and the client in
the hope that, in defending himself, the lawyer will reveal confidences and secrets which will strengthen plaintiff's case against
the client (the real adverse party in the litigation)."' Thus, having secured the right to reveal client confidences, attorneys have
left themselves vulnerable to suit.
Because the ABA has not officially responded to the
Meyerhofer 5' and Friend5 ' cases, there is no "official" justifica-

tion for the broad reading which DR 4-101(C)(4) has invited and
violate the attorney-client privilege. At the same time the Bar has attempted to weaken
the privilege through DR 4-101(C)(4)'s dramatic liberalization of the exception for unpaid
or accused attorneys.
147. In DR 4-101(C)(4), the ABA has arguably contradicted even its own Canon 9
entitled "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety,"
which urges atorneys to "promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profession." In a gem of unintended irony, Sutton, the reporter to the committee which wrote
the Code, has opined that the old ethical system needed revision because "several of the
traditional canons seem more concerned with self-interests of lawyers than with the interests of the public." Sutton, supra note 87, at 258.
148. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975).
149. 273 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-9 (1974) (quoting petition for certiorari No.
74-292 (Sept. 18, 1974)).
150. See R. KEETON, TRIuAL TACTICS AND METHODS § 10.2 (2d ed. 1973). Thomas Schell-

ing has done important theoretical work on the relinquishment of freedom as a strategy
in various conflict situations. Having no options can be an effective way to paralyze
opposition, in which case increased freedom brings greater vulnerability to coercion. See
T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 137-39 (1960). For an interesting but successful
opposition effort to apply this strategy in a legal setting, see Board of Educ. v. Associated
Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972).
151. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975).
152. In re Friend, 411 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

33

816

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1977], Art. 2

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1977]

received. If the past is our guide, however, the bar can be expected to make at least two arguments in defense of its rule. First
and foremost, it will be argued that fundamental fairness requires
protection of an attorney's right to self-defense: "The general rule
should not be carried to the extent of depriving the lawyer of the
means of obtaining or defending his own rights."'' 3 This argument, however, carries little weight when used against innocent
clients whose secrets are revealed in the course of attorney litigation with third parties; only when the attorney and client are in
direct opposition can the client be accused of attempting to take
advantage of the privilege to deny the lawyer his rights and an
implied waiver be found. Further, the argument fails to take
account of the fact that an attorney is not permitted to disclose
confidences in defense of the rights of a wronged defendant,
however serious the trespass upon them. There is both irony and
inequity in this last point: If a court knew what the attorney
knows, the court might order disclosure. The court cannot know
what the attorney knows, however, because the information is
privileged. Furthermore, the court will not learn the relevant
confidences until the attorney steps forward-an event which will
ordinarily occur only when the lawyer's own interests are at stake.
In defense of its rule the ABA might also argue that the
exception in its broadest form is necessary to insure effective legal
representation because of the difficulty of attracting persons of
high caliber to the profession absent assurances that they will be
able to defend themselves against wrongful accusations and collect reasonable fees.154 It might also be argued that in the absence
of a broad exception attorneys will refuse certain cases or remain
intentionally ignorant of particular client activities because full
and open dealings would leave them open to accusations which
they would be handicapped in refuting. This last argument is
premised on feared developments which, although not inconceivable, are highly unlikely because it is always difficult to predict
which of an attorney's activities will ultimately give rise to controversy with a client, and because courts and agencies are unlikely to accept an attorney's plea of ignorance or noninyolvement
unless it is both justified and absolute. Futhermore, the fears are
153. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs OPINIONS, No. 250 (1943). That opinion
concerned a controversy between attorney and client.
154. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 91, at 191. See also Gardner, supra note 132,
at 308.
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unfounded because selective ignorance may itself be negligent
and leave an attorney open to charges of malpractice or other
wrongdoing.'55 In other words, there are powerful counterincentives to attorney "withdrawal" in response to a narrow exception.
At most, some lawyers might demand payment in advance or the
posting of a bond to secure legal fees due.
The deficiency of conventional arguments in support of a
broad exception should not lead the reader to conclude immediately that a liberal exception is unwarranted. In its analyses of
the exception, the bar assumes that the privilege is nearly absolute and that it is premised on the desirability of encouraging
attorney-client candor. Neither of those assumptions is inevitable, however, and their modification or abandonment would permit a more coherent defense of a broadened exception for the
accused attorney.
It is clear, in the first place, that whatever is done to limit
the attorney-client privilege will increase the amount of probative
evidence upon which legal findings of fact are based and thus
improve the accuracy of those findings and the quality of the
justice delivered by our legal system. As a crack in the wall of the
privilege, the exception is a step in the right direction, to be
applauded for what truths it exposes. Such reasoning is not likely
to receive the endorsement of the bar, which has never offered the
advancement of truth as a justification for the exception, but it
will certainly find favor with the growing number who oppose an
absolute privilege, and who favor flexibility and trial judge
'
discretion in deciding upon its use. 56
A second foundation upon which the broad exception may
rest is somewhat more subtle. '57 While it is often said that the
basis of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
' it has also been acthe unreliability of coerced confessions, 58
155. The SEC, for example, has so interpreted its famed Rule 10b-5. See SEC v.
95,784 (D.D.C.
National Student Marketing Corp., [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Dec. 6, 1976) (summary of pretrial brief for the SEC).
156. Bentham's was the most famous attack on the privilege; J. BENrHAM, RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), reprintedin 7 THE WoRKs OF JEREMY BENTHM 473-79 (Bowring ed. 1842). More recent commentators have generally shunned Bentham's frontal assault in favor of a call for flexibility in the use of the privilege. See note 180 infra.
157. The rationale developed below was first suggested to the author by Professor
Monroe Freedman of the Hofstra University School of Law.
158. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); The King v. Warichshall, 168 Eng.
Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783); C. McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 118, at 251, §§ 147-56, at 313-24.
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knowledged that the privilege rests at least in part upon fundamental considerations of fairness, human dignity, and the integrity of the individual."' 9 If an individual has potentially selfincriminating information, society will not refuse permission to
withhold it. We are too civilized to compel any human being to
commit legal suicide. 6 '
Conceivably then it can be argued by analogy that if an
accused attorney has exculpatory evidence he or she should not
be barred from using it in his or her own defense. It is simply too
much to ask that an accused lawyer in possession of exculpatory
evidence remain silent because of professional duty while another
flays his or her competence or integrity. This factor alone provides a powerful rationalization for permitting self-serving conduct in extreme situations, and it has the added virture of entirely sidestepping questions about the basis of the attorneyclient privilege itself. As a justification for the broadened exception to the privilege it is consistent with recent commentary
which finds the foundation for the privilege not in the need for
candor but in the human dignity and individual integrity which,
it is argued, underlies the exception. 6' Interestingly, this rationale would support attorney disclosure of client confidences in
defense against at least some third-party accusations, but it probably could not support disclosure by attorneys in suits to recover
unpaid fees.
159. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.): "Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency"; Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). McCormick aptly summarized this point as follows:
The privilege also, and perhaps most importantly, serves the function of assuring that even guilty individuals are treated in a manner consistent with basic
respect for human dignity. Wholly apart from its function in assuring the accuracy of the guilty-determining process, the privilege demands that even those
guilty of an offense not be compelled beyond a certain extent to participate in
the establishment of their own guilt. This is based upon the feeling that to
require participation would be simply too great a violation of the dignity of the
individual, whether or not he is guilty of a criminal offense.
C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 118, at 252.
160. [W]e do not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death
warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull the lever that springs the trap on which
he stands. We have through the course of history developed a considerable
feeling of the dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the
evil man is a human being.
E. GRIswoLD, THE FJurH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955). The sentiment is not a new one:
Griswold elsewhere quotes Justice Field ("that old tartar") as writing that "[tihe essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own guilt is obvious to every
one, and needs no illustration." Id. at 8.
161. See Gardner, supra note 132, at 279, 308, 455-56.
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V.

THE FUTURE OF THE EXCEPTION

Retention of DR 4-101(C)(4) as construed in Meyerhofer612
and Friend' is certainly not in the best interests of either the
public or the legal profession. Abolition of the exception, on the
other hand, is not likely given the bar's influence over such matters. The problem is thus one of deciding how best to tame the
exception to simultaneously preserve the rights of attorneys, protect clients against unwarranted disclosure of their confidences,
discourage attorney abuse of and excessive reliance upon the exception, and improve the perceived fairness of the legal system.
Amending DR 4-101(C)(4) to conform to the Uniform Rule
and Federal Standard is one obvious and attractive possibility
which would effectively eliminate disclosure in defense against
third-party accusations and reinstate the common law rule. By
placing relatively clear limits on the exception and avoiding the
ambiguity of the common law language, this approach promises
an end to the vulnerability of uninvolved clients and clear guidance to attorneys concerning the situations in which client confidences may safely be disclosed. It is true that the codifications
are not perfect," 4 but their textual deficiencies are easily correctable.
In most instances prohibiting the exception's use in response
to third-party accusations, as is done in the codifications, is commendable. There are important cases, however, in which this may
not be true. Consider, for example, a suit in which a third party
charges a lawyer with serious wrongdoing, and disclosure of an
unimportant client confidence might help to establish his innocence. In the Suydam case there was no allegation of a breach of
duty by the client to his lawyer, yet the decision in favor of disclosure was undoubtedly a just one. Can DR 4-101(C) (4) be modified
to permit disclosure where warranted without at the same time
undermining the basis of the privilege and opening the door to
abuse?
The possibilities for amendment are almost endless, but all
of the conceivable changes take one of three forms: substantive
alteration of the scope of the exception, reform of the exception's
administration and the consequences of invoking it, and modifi162. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975). See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
163. In re Friend, 411 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See text accompanying notes
103-104 supra.
164. See text accompanying notes 85-105 supra.
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cations of related law which may affect the exception's use and/or
public perception of its inherent equity.
The scope of the exception might be altered, for example, by
resurrecting the standard which prevailed under the original
Canon 37 and permitting disclosure only in defense against false
accusations or to aid in the collection of reasonable and justified
compensation.-' The theory is that this would discourage resort
to the exception in marginal cases by creating the risk that even
good-faith disclosure of confidences would not shield an attorney
from disciplinary action should accusations prove accurate or fees
undeserved.
Substantive reform might also be achieved by limiting the
class of cases in which the exception could be invoked. The
relevant communications can be divided into four classes by use
of a simple two-by-two matrix:
Made in reference to Made in reference to
a matter now being a matter other than
that now litigated.
litigated,
With Client-Opponent

1

2

With Client other than
present Opponent

3

4

Communications in the first "cell" of the matrix are those
disclosable under the common law exception, as when a criminal
defendant charges that his attorney told him he could not legally
take the stand and the attorney is allowed to give his version of
the disputed conversation. In such cases, the disclosed communications are between the lawyer and the particular client, now his
adversary, and they concern the specific transaction or occurrence in dispute. The second cell also includes communications
with the client-opponent, but in this class of cases the communications at issue were originally unrelated to the present dispute.
A typical "cell 2" case exists where a client informs his lawyer of
property which he secretly owns, and the attorney attempts to
attach these holdings when the client later refuses to pay a bill
for services rendered in a matter unrelated to the property.'6 '
165. See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Nakasian v. Incontrade, 409 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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The third cell, by contrast, refers to communications with a
client who is not the present opponent. The communication does
deal directly, however, with the subject matter of the instant
litigation. The standard third-party accuser case involves communications which fall within this class. Meyerhofer v. Empire
Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,Il where the communications in
issue concerned preparation of a prospectus later claimed fraudulent, is an example of such a case. Finally, communications in the
fourth cell are between the attorney and an uninvolved client and
concern a transaction or occurrence remote from that now in dispute. A "cell 4" case exists when the attorney sued by client A
seeks to introduce his unrelated communications with client B to
prove his innocence. 8'
The matrix makes analysis of different variations of the exception easier by showing at a glance what each permits to be
revealed. The common law exception would probably permit disclosure of all otherwise admissible conversations with a clientopponent (cells I and 2). The Uniform Rule and Federal Standard
are ambiguous; California's requirement that an alleged breach
be one "arising out of the lawyer-client relationship" seems to be
a partially successful effort to exclude from the exception communications with a client other than the present opponent (cells
3 and 4).1es DR 4-101(C)(4), on its face and as construed, would
certainly permit disclosure of communications with a nonopponent client which concerned the transaction or event being litigated, for example, Meyerhofer, and would presumably reach
communications in cell 4 as well.
The case for disclosure weakens as one advances from cell 1
to cell 4 and the involvement of the client whose communications
are to be disclosed decreases; it seems unjust to permit disclosure
in the absence of a close nexus between the litigation and the
particular communication the attorney seeks to reveal. Arguably,
a variable standard would be appropriate. Whereas it is discom167. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975).

168. In this hypothetical situation it is assumed that the communications between
the attorney and B concerned a transaction or occurrence other than that involved in
advising A. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
169. This approach was once endorsed by the ABA Ethics Committee: "ITMhe

adjudicated cases recognize an exception. . . where disclosure is necessary to protect the
attorney's interest arising out of the relation of attorney and client in which disclosure was
made." ABA Comm. ON PROFESsIONAL ETHics OPINIONS, No. 250 (1943). Opinion 250 and
the quoted excerpt are cited at ABA CODE, DR 4-101(C)(4) n.1.
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forting to allow disclosure of communications with the opposing
client (let alone uninvolved clients) when the attorney is suing for
his fee and the communication is unrelated in time or circumstance to the suit, no communication (except perhaps those on
other subjects with other clients, cell 4) should be immune from
revelation when a lawyer is charged with serious wrongdoing.
Procedural and administrative change can have as much
impact on the exception's use and image as substantive alteration. It might be wise to depart from the decision in In re Friend7 '
and deem a lawyer "accused" only after he is indicted or named
as a defendant in a civil suit. The filing of a complaint or indictment is both a natural point at which to pronounce an accusation
real rather than speculative, and the moment at which the courts
become fully capable of intervening to protect the interests of the
client public. Given "[t]he damage to . . .professional reputation which might be occasioned by the mere pendency of. . . a
charge," '' it is not surprising that many lawyers are almost embarrassingly eager to bare their clients' souls at the first hint of
trouble. A change such as that suggested would foreclose this
possibility until the threat is a tangible one. Again, however, a
varying standard might be in order to permit an attorney facing
possible criminal charges to disclose confidences earlier than his
or her colleague threatened only with a civil suit.
Unwarranted disclosure could also be discouraged through a
requirement that the attorney seeking to invoke the exception
make an initial showing that the commmunications to be offered
are relevant, nonprejudicial, and necessary. Disclosure outside of
a courtroom might be forbidden absent a court order issued after
a similar showing. Prima facie evidence that a fraud or crime has
been committed has always been required before the courts will
permit disclosure of confidences under the exception to the privilege for communications in furtherance of a criminal purpose.'
170. In re Friend, 411 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
171. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975).
172. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932) (Cardozo, J.):
A client who congults an attorney for advice that will servehim in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told.
, * *To drive the privilege away, there must be "something to give colour to the
charge"; there must be "prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in
fact."
Id. at 12 (citations omitted). Accord, United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655, 658 (7th
Cir. 1973); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 96, at 200 n.51.
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Several commentators, including one who favors a broad construction of DR 4-101(C)(4), have suggested that a similar showing precede use of the exception for accused or unpaid attorneys"'
to discourage abuse by foreclosing unilateral disclosure.
Judicial authority need not be limited to excluding or admitting the evidence offered; one might also permit judicial redaction of communications to mitigate the undesirable side effects
of revelation.1 4 Deletion of names and unnecessary details after
an in camera showing of the need to disclose may be of limited
utility, however, because of the hearsay and best evidence problems thus created. Redaction will hide little in a case where it is
obvious from the context that specific conduct of known individuals is involved, and in other cases deletion of identifying information may all but destroy the probative value of the evidence 7
Beyond the reach of judges, automatic ethics committee review of the exception's use (with a presumption against the propriety of disclosure if followed by a decision or verdict against the
attorney involved) would certainly create disincentives to casual
disclosure in marginal cases, and would provide a formal mechanism for the protection of client interest. Whatever limits are
placed on the exception, there will always be situations in which
the question of disclosure is a close one. If the fact that the exception is disfavored (because inimical to the basic policy of the
privilege) is to have any meaning at all, its use should be foresworn in marginal or doubtful cases. Automatic ethics committee
review encourages self-discipline within the profession by placing
lawyers on notice that no disclosure in the face of the privilege
will escape scrutiny for possible inconsistency with the Code, and
that disclosure in a case later lost will almost certainly lead to
disciplinary action.
173. See Goldberg, supra note 73, at 250-51; Note, Mo. L. REy., supra note 12, at
334. Such a rule would not be inconsistent with the holding and circumstances of the
Meyerhofer or Friend decisions.
174. I am indebted to Judge Jack Weinstein for initially suggesting the possible
utility of in camera redaction in connection with the exception. Doe v. A Corp., 330 F.
Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), is one case which illustrates the use of redaction and sealing
of records to protect the identities of individuals involved in sensitive transactions of
questionable ethics; the case is also interesting as an early example of the application of
DR 4-101.
175. Omission of the names from a business record offered in evidence, for example,
would give rise to an objection that opposing counsel can hardly call the individuals in
the record to the stand and verify the accuracy of the record if he does not know who they
are.
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Modifications affecting the use and perception of the exception can also be made in other areas of the law. The United States
could adopt the British rule abrogating the attorney-client privilege as to any communication which might help to establish the
innocence of a criminal defendant."' Such a rule would surely be
more equitable than one allowing an exception for lawyers alone,
and it soundly places the need to do justice in criminal cases
ahead of the candor-encouraging policy behind the privilege. The
English experience refutes the assertion that placing the interests
of justice ahead of the privilege will destroy the frankness necessary to effective legal representation.
Similarly, an obligation could be imposed on lawyers to warn
persons whose safety or welfare is threatened by the intended
unlawful action of a client, even when knowledge of the danger
has been gleaned through confidential communications. Such a
duty to warn has already been adopted in California as an exception to the physician-patient privilege. 7 Like the preceding proposal, this one might make the exception less objectionable because it compels lawyers to protect others in circumstances which
are the same or analogous to those in which they can protect
themselves.
Finally, clients whose communications are revealed through
use of the exception could be protected (by statute, if necessary)
against use of the disclosure in any subsequent action. Such "use
immunity" is consistent with the holdings of two recent New
York cases.'78 It assumes the necessity of disclosure and attempts
176. See note 136 supra for a description of the English Rule. For a discussion of this

issue as it relates to the American system, see Note, Attorney-Client Confidentiality:A
New Approach, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 685 (1976).

177. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974)(Psychotherapist treating a mentally ill patient owes a duty of reasonable care to give threatened persons a warning necessary to avert foreseeable danger
arising from his patient's condition or treatment.). For further discussion of Tarasoff and
its implications see Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapiststo Safeguard

Society, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 358 (1976); Note, 28 VAND. L. REv. 631 (1975). The courts are
more flexible in dealing with the physician-patient privilege than with its attorney-client
analogue. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
178. See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 45 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), vacated, 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d
64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966); Matison
v. Matison, 95 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 770, 97 N.Y.S.
2d 550 (1st Dep't 1950). Both cases hold that disclosure by the attorney under the exception is not a waiver of the attorney-client privilege for all purposes and all times, and the
client may bar the same disclosure in a subsequent action between a third person and
himself. But see United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956). The proposed
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to cushion its impact, but it is unsatisfactory in several respects.
First, use immunity would not mitigate the embarrassment and
business losses which can accompany public disclosure and frequently overshadow the danger of unrelated future litigation.
Second, by decreasing the costs of its use such a rule would encourage lawyers to resort to the exception; abuses paralleling
those which have plagued use immunity laws in other contexts
may result.
The principal disadvantage of modification through specific
rules and limitations is that factors unique to a particular case
may be persuasive or even determinative of the desirability of
permitting attorney disclosure, and the process of writing a rule
for each situation as it arises is self-defeating. In place of such
particularization, why not abandon authoritative rules and vest
discretion in trial judges to decide the admissibility of communi179
cations offered pursuant to the exception?
In other words, a disclosure which is essentially harmless to
the client whose confidence is being violated ought to be admitted
before a disclosure which will embarrass the client, expose him
to legal liability, or interfere with his business interest. Similarly,
disclosures necessary to the attorney-those providing unique or
uniquely unimpeachable evidence-should be more hospitably
received than those which are redundant or only marginally related to essential elements of the lawyer's case. Whatever the
substantive content of the governing law, the kind of balancing
of interests called for here must be delegated to the trial judge or
18
abandoned altogether. 1
Proposals to delegate authority over all aspects of the
attorney-client privilege to trial judges have generated much
discussion of late. 1 ' The major argument of those opposed to such
law was first suggested to this author by Prof. Monroe Freedman of the Hofstra University

School of Law but he has not endorsed it and should not be blamed for its appearance
here. For a more detailed discussion of such a proposal, see Note, supra note 176.
179. This position has been taken by U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein. Interview
with Judge Jack Weinstein, in Great Neck, N.Y. (Jan. 1, 1976).
180. See Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 905, 963 (1976)
181. See, e.g., C. McCoRmicK, supranote 2, § 87, at 177, Gardner, supra note 132, at
315; Note, supra note 176; Note, 56 Nw. U.L. REv., supra note 121, at 256-59.
North Carolina has introduced such a regime to govern the physician-patient privilege. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1969) reads in part:
No [physician] shall be required to disclose any information which he may

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1977], Art. 2

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1977]

proposals is that only an absolute privilege will assure the necessary attorney-client candor. This argument is not relevant when
only the exception is at issue. Indeed, insofar as judicial supervision would check faithless attorneys who now have a free hand,
judicial discretion would encourage full and frank communication within the attorney-client relationship.
Judicial discretion, of course, is only as good as the individuals exercising it. To the extent that the judiciary is corrupt, incompetent or simply uninterested, bad law will be made and
injustice done. The problem of human frailty and the inconsistent
judgments which result therefrom can be minimized by providing
clear guidelines which assure that all decisionmakers act within
the same framework.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the complexity of the factors to be weighed in deciding the admissibility of evidence under the exception precludes
effective use of specific, rigid rules. Flexible standards should be
formulated, therefore, to guide the exercise of judicial discretion.
The distinction between the law of the attorney-client privilege and the ethical precepts governing client confidences has not
been faithfully observed in this paper. Such treatment, though
confusing, accurately reflects the current state of affairs. Nevertheless, recommendations for change must be drafted separately
for the Federal and Uniform Rules of Evidence, and for the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility. The common law, which is
inherently flexible and ultimately tends to emulate progressive
codifications, will take care of itself.
An initial recommendation is that the Federal Rules of Evidence be amended to include a provision based on the text of, and
notes accompanying, Federal Standard 503(d)(3)82 and Uniform
Rule 502(d)(3) ' s3 to read as follows:
There is no privilege under this rule ... as to a communication necessary to establish a breach of duty by a client to his
lawyer, or to defend a lawyer against accusations of wrongful
conduct, or to prove the innocence of any criminal defendant,
have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character.. . . Provided,
that the court, either at the trial or prior thereto, may compel such disclosure,

if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice.
This statute is discussed in Note, 41 N.C.L. REv. 627 (1963). It was viewed with some
enthusiasm by Wigmore. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2381, at 832.
182. Fed. Standard 503(d)(3), 2 WmENsTmN's EVIDENCE, supra note 8, 503(d)(3)(01).
183. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVID. 502(d)(3) (1974).
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provided that disclosure of a communication on these grounds
shall be unlawful only after a judicial finding that such disclosure is necessary and in the interests of justice.
Note
This rule restates the common law with some modification,
chiefly in the extension of the exception to benefit criminal defendants and the addition of a requirement of judicial prescreening of communications to be disclosed.
A decision that disclosure is necessary will normally rest on
a finding that the communication in question is unique or
uniquely unimpeachable evidence which is probative of an essential fact or element, e.g., one without proof of which a case
cannot be made or the falsity of charges demonstrated.
A decision that disclosure is in the interests of justice may
rest upon a finding of client waiver of the attorney-client privilege, as when the client attacks the integrity or competence of
his attorney.
In the absence of an express or implied waiver, the following
factors may be used to weigh the justice of a proposed
disclosure:
1) Substantial adversity of interest between the attorney
and the client whose communications he seeks to reveal.
2) The nexus between the communication in question
and the transaction or occurrence upon which the instant
lawsuit or prosecution is based.
3) The extent to which disclosure will adversely affect the
individual or organization whose communications are to be
revealed. Adverse effects include, but are not limited to,
vulnerability to civil or criminal suits, disturbance of business or personal relations, and embarrassment.
4) The stake of the attorney or criminal defendant in the
litigation, e.g., the gravity of the alleged crime, breach of
duty or accusation of wrongful conduct.
5) Any other factor bearing on the justice of the proposed
disclosure, including the possibility of redaction to remove
extraneous material without substantial impairment of the
communication's probative value and the public interest
in both maximizing the evidence available to the trier of
facts and encouraging full disclosure between attorney
and client.
DR 4-101(C)(4),84 in keeping with the spirit of the Code's
184. ABA CODE, DR 4-101(C)(4).
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Ethical Consideration 4-485 should be consistent with the law
governing the privilege but more reluctant than the shbstantive
law to permit disclosure of client confidences. Moreover, in the
interest of the privilege's integrity and public confidence in the
profession, the bar should not shrink from creating disincentives
to the use of the exception. Accordingly, the Code should be
amended to read as follows:
DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect a reasonable fee, defend himself against a false accusation of wrongful conduct, or prevent the conviction of one
wrongfully accused of a crime, when permitted by a court

order confirming the justice and necessity of the disclosure.
(E) Disclosure by an attorney on his own behalf under DR

4-101(C)(4) shall be reviewed by the bar association with jurisdiction over the disclosing attorney for a determination of the
disclosure's ethical propriety. A final judgment against an attorney's claim for compensation or in favor of one accusing the
attorney of wrongful conduct shall create a presumption that
disclosures under DR 4-101(C)(4) made during the course of
litigation preceding the judgment were unethical and in violation of this Code.
While the proposed revision of DR 4-101(C)(4) should create
relatively few problems, the newly proposed DR 4-101(E) will
undoubtedly face bitter opposition. To many lawyers it will seem
unduly harsh because it subjects the attorney who uses DR 4101(C)(4) on his own behalf to grave risks of disciplinary action.
Moreover, it will strike some as redundant; the revised DR 4185. ABA CODE, EC 4-4 provides:

The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of
a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept,
unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of
information or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to whom
the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an obligation to advise the client
of the attorney-client privilege and timely to assert the privilege unless it is
waived by the client.
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101(C)(4) permits disclosure only after a judge is satisfied that it
is both necessary and just. Why require more?
DR 4-101(E) is harsh and unforgiving. The need for such a
provision to discourage unscrupulous and indiscriminate use of
the exception arises because the exception singles out lawyers for
favorable treatment (though, as revised, criminal defendants will
also benefit from it). ' The bar, therefore, must be vigilant in
protecting against its abuse. Because the exception undermines
the policy favoring attorney-client candor on which the privilege
is based and threatens to make lawyers more (not less) vulnerable
to attack, its use must be discouraged except in those cases where
financial loss or disgrace is otherwise a near certainty.
DR 4-101(E) is not redundant. The judge's decision that
disclosure is necessary and just is a determination of a question
of law; it is not an ethical judgment. Legal ethics, to be meaningful, must demand more than the law requires. 8 7 A court order
permitting disclosure will shield the attorney from subsequent
liability for his revelations except in extreme cases of fraud or
perjury,'8 8 but it should not protect him from scrutiny by his
peers.
These are troubled times for the image of the legal profession' 5 9-many do seem to believe that one might as well trust a
fox to guard geese as trust a lawyer to look out for the interests
of his clients. In such an environment, it is vital that an attorney
be allowed to defend himself when his livelihood or competence
are under attack, and that the rules allowing him to do so not be
perceived as self-serving.
186. For further discussion of the need for such a provision see text accompanying
notes 184-185 supra.
187. The Code often imposes requirements beyond those mandated in the law. See.,
e.g., ABA CODE, Canons 4 & 7. That Canon 4 aims higher than the law but may in fact
fall short (gee text accompanying notes 122-124 supra) does not repudiate this principle,
but rather gives it a hitherto unneeded urgency.
ABA CODE, EC 6-5 provides: "A lawyer should have pride in his professional endeavors. His obligation to act competently calls for higher motivation than that arising from
fear of civil liability or disciplinary penalty."
188. "No appellate case has been found in which a client has recovered from his
attorney for improper disclosure, under judicial order, of privileged information. Nor does
there appear to be any instance of censure or disbarment for such conduct." Note, 45
WASH. L. REv., supra note 141, at 185.
189. The incidence of claims against lawyers appears to be rising and will undoubtedly
continue, spurred on by decisions such as Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589,
118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), which created new and stricter standards of care by which to
judge attorneys accused of malpractice. See T. Goldstein, Lawyers' MalpracticeInsurance
Rising Steadily as Claims Increase, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1977 at 1, cols. 5-6.
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